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I INTRODUCTION 
" ... if coalitions were ever to become frequent no doubt 
resignations would increase as well ... "
2 
2 
The objective of this paper was to test a hypothesis, which is partially reflected in the 
above prediction, over the impact that the introduction of coalition government in New 
Zealand may have had on the constitutional convention of collective responsibility. 
While the particular source of that quote may have been from a time of stable single-
paiiy government, with near complete Cabinet control over Parliament, the sentiment 
behind the quote intuitively appealed. 
The hypothesis that was set for this paper was that: 
Under Coalition Government it is more likely that breaches of collective 
responsibility will occur, that these breaches will be more likely to be 
implicitly or explicitly accepted, and that breaches will be less likely to lead 
to sanctions. The lower likelihood of sanctions will reflect the political 
practicality of a greater dependence on member of Cabinet with divergent 
views under Coalition government and the mixed member proportional 
representation electoral system (MMP). 
This paper sets out to test the above hypothesis by describing in Part II the theory and 
background to the constitutional convention of collective responsibility. Part II draws 
upon international evidence about the existence of the convention. It also discusses the 
convention's reflection in New Zealand prior to the introduction of MMP in 1996, 
culminating with the Cabinet Office Manual's statement of how the convention applied. 
Part III of this paper discusses the impact that the introduction of coalition government 
and MMP has had on the convention's status in New Zealand since 1996. Part III 
discusses commentary on the predicted impact of these changes, the reflection of the 
convention in the two coalition agreements entered into since 1996 and recent 
modifications to the Cabinet Manual to reflect the changing nature of the convention. It 
concludes with a summary of the impacts of these changes on the convention. 
Part IV provides a framework for analysing the instances where the convention has been 
breached. This framework for analysis is based on a number of factors that can be 
ascribed, to varying degrees, to each breach. It also discusses the incentives for the 
enforcement of the requirement to resign, and the Prime Minister's power to dismiss, 
where a breach has occurred. Paii V then applies this framework to the empirical 
evidence on breaches, which includes instances dating from 1932 to 1999, and under both 
single-party governments and coalition governments, as well as under the first-past-the-
2 John Roberts Po!iticans, Public Servants and Public Ente,prise: Restructuring the New Zealand
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post and MMP electoral systems. 
Part V also includes a summary table, which attempts to ascribe values to factors present 
in each breach. This information is then used in Part VI to describe the trends that are 
identifiable from the evidence in Part V. These trends are analysed over three time 
periods: trends from 1932 to 1984; trends from 1984 to 1996; and trends from after 1996. 
Part VII provides concluding comments on the extent to which the hypothesis above is 
supported by the evidence analysed and the trends identified. 
II THEORY I BACKGROUND 
A The Convention of Collective Responsibility 
The convention of collective responsibility underpins the functioning of Cabinet, within 
countries that have Cabinet systems of government, by ensuring that the Cabinet acts as 
one. Collective responsibility is generally viewed as involving the following three 
elements that lead to Cabinet acting as a united body: 
• confidence - Parliament expresses its confidence in Cabinet collectively, through 
confidence votes, rather than expressing confidence in individual ministers; 
• unanimity - Ministers must collectively support Cabinet decisions, irrespective of 
their own opinion on the matter; and 
• confidentiality - Cabinet discussions should remain confidential. 
Collective responsibility meets the definition of being a constitutional convention on the 
grounds that it is enforced through political institutions, rather than through legal 
mechanisms. Conventions are essentially facilitative mechanisms, without legal standing 
but with the ability to constrain actions through political means. As such they may be 
seen as pragmatic political rules, that reflect established political practice and precedent. 
This is clearly the view of Joseph, who went so far as to challenge the existence of the 
convention: 3 
.. . the constitutional convention [ of collective responsibility,] which the Prime 
Minister eagerly refened as justifying his ultimatum, and which the political scientists 
affirmed, is fictional. In New Zealand (and probably also the United Kingdom) the notion 
that Cabinet must stand as one on the policies it adopts has never been more than a rule of 
pragmatic politics. 
Collective responsibility fonns one of the non-binding rules by which politicians govern 
their own conduct. Collective responsibility is a prime example of this non-binding 
nature, as Cabinet or the Prime Minister may choose not to enforce the requirement to 
resign. By doing so, however, they will inevitably open themselves up to political 
scrutiny. 
3 Philip A. Joseph "The Honourable D.F. Quigley's Resignation Sfrictly Political - Not Constitutional" 
(1982) 1 Canta L R 428,429. 
4 
The key to the convention can be seen to be the need for unanimity within Cabinet. 
While the convention also involves the elements of confidence and confidentiality, these 
matters are also essentially reinforcements of the need for unanimity. If there is not 
unanimity, then the likelihood that Cabinet will be able to survive confidence votes will 
be decreased, due to the fractious nature of the Cabinet. Similarly, if the confidence 
element is not respected, then the appearance of unanimity may quickly be shattered, 
bringing into doubt the sustainability of the Cabinet. 
The convention is a common feature of a number of countries that operate a cabinet 
system of government, irrespective of the actual structure of that cabinet system. In a 
study of the operation of cabinet systems of government Laver and Shepsle commented 
emphatically on the application of collective responsibility:4 
Obviously, if individual cabinet ministers can ignore cabinet decisions without this 
being realized, or even openly defy them, then they will be very powerful within their own 
departments, and collective cabinet decisions will mean very little . ... In the first place, it 
seems that it is not possible for a minister simply to ignore a significant cabinet decision 
relating to his or her department without this being realized and publicized, by either the 
media, the civil service, or cabinet colleagues .... it is just not possible to ignore a collective 
decision made by the cabinet. 
If, instead of ignoring a cabinet decision, a minister chooses to defy it, our authors are 
equally adamant about the consequences. The minister concerned must resign, or will be 
sacked. 
Laver and Shepsle's study included descriptions of the operation of cabinet systems of 
government in a diverse range of countries. These included countries with varying 
degrees of Prime Ministerial or Presidential power, different proportions of ministers 
inside and outside of cabinet, and different coalition structures within cabinets and 
governments as a whole. This can be taken to reinforce the notion that collective 
responsibility will continue to have a significant role in New Zealand under coalition 
government situations. 
B Breaches of the Convention and Sanctions 
The above three elements operate in different manners, are binding in different manners 
and are capable of breach to differing degrees. The first element essentially requires that 
Cabinet as a whole must operate together, maintaining a sufficiently unified front that 
they are capable of ensuring that Parliament will support them when a confidence vote is 
called. 
The situations 111 which a confidence vote can be called or where a matter will 
automatically be considered to be a confidence vote are limited. These matters primarily 
relate to situations where there is such a wide-ranging debate in Parliament that its 
4 Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentmy Government (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994) 297. 
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subject matter can be said to be fundamental to the credibility of the Government. 5 
Examples of such matters include the Address-in-Reply and "supply" matters such as 
Appropriation Bills. In practice, confidence votes may also be proposed by the 
government, in order to signify the seriousness of a particular issue to the continuation of 
that government. As such, confidence votes may be used to ensure that "rogue" members 
of government parties, or other parties that support the government, do not vote against 
the government on a significant matter. 
In practice, confidence reflects the support that members of the Government and any 
supporting parties have in the Cabinet members (and to a degree the control that those 
Cabinet members have over the members of their own parties). This element is, 
therefore, binding on Cabinet collectively and is enforced by Parliament collectively 
(although nominally by the Governor-General). The first element of the convention can 
not be breached, in the sense that the consequence of being unable to maintain collective 
confidence is that the Cabinet ( and the Government from which they are drawn) must 
resign. 
The second and third elements apply to Ministers individually rather than collectively. 
These elements are an integral part of the system of Cabinet controls that ensure 
Ministers act in a unified manner, so that confidence in the Cabinet and the Government 
is maintained. The sanction for breaches of these elements of collective responsibility is 
that the Minister concerned will be required to resign, with the corollary threat that if they 
do not resign then they may be dismissed. The Prime Minister acting to dismiss a 
Minister generally enforces the threat of dismissal. In the case of the current Labour / 
Alliance Coalition Government, the leaders of each of the Labour and Alliance parties are 
respectively responsible for dismissing Labour and Alliance Ministers who breach these 
elements of the convention. 
This sanction will be enforced through political means, and is not a measure that can 
generally be enforced by others if the Minister concerned refuses to resign and the Prime 
Minister chooses not to dismiss the Minister concerned. These restrictions on 
enforcement apply equally to other Ministers who have been affected by the breach of 
collective responsibility, in the sense that their recourse is to politically attempt to require 
resignation or dismissal, rather than having other methods to require resignation or 
dismissal. 
C Importance of the Co11ve11tio11 
Collective responsibility fulfils a key role in the management of cabinet behaviour. In 
essence, it aims to foster collegial relations between ministers by ensuring that they are: 
• informed about matters that other ministers are responsible for; 
• able to debate and discuss matters of common interest; and 
5 David McGee Parliamenta,y Practice in New Zealand (2 Ed, GP Publications, Wellington, 1994) 70 -
73. 
6 
• responsible for collective decisions by virtue of their role in the decision making 
process. 
Collective responsibility may appear to result in outcomes that are contrary to the 
individual interests of ministers in cabinets, especially where those ministers have strong 
personal views on matters or represent constituencies with divergent interests. Even in 
these circumstances, as James notes, collective responsibility is an essential mechanism 
to maintain effective cabinet government:6 
The rationale for this seeming absurdity is the need for the government to present a 
united front. If ministers may contradict each other in public and abide by some decisions 
but not others, confusion and division will soon set in. The position of a minister who is 
publicly criticised by his colleagues will become untenable, and a government whose policies 
are under fire from its own members will lose its authority. It is an illogical, even distasteful 
doctrine, but there is no practical alternative to it. Collective responsibility is an organised 
hypocrisy, but a necessary one. 
The justification for ministers accepting this hypocrisy can be seen in the context of the 
range of matters that ministers are expected to bring before cabinet. A simple test for 
what matters a minister should seek collective agreement about is the objective question 
"would I wish to be consulted on this matter if another minister was responsible for it?" 
Each minister can expect, therefore, that they will need to seek collective agreement to 
matters within their nominal areas of individual responsibility. The incentive to comply 
with the requirements of collective responsibility, other than the sanctions for breach, is 
the recognition that each minister's behaviour may impact on how other ministers behave 
in relation to the areas of each other's responsibilities. 
The nature of the incentives that serve to reinforce the need for collective responsibility 
can also be seen to question whether it is truly a constitutional question, consistent with 
Joseph's view discussed earlier. 
D Reflection of the Convention in New Zealand 
It is clear that these elements have formed part of the constitutional background in New 
Zealand for a considerable period of time. In 1962 Scott described the convention in the 
following way: 7 
The doctrine of collective responsibility is the doctrine that every member of Cabinet 
must be willing to give public support to every policy that has been adopted by Cabinet; and 
that any minister who finds he is unable to do so must resign. 
While the convention has formed a part of the New Zealand political scene for some 
time, it has more recently been fornrnlly reflected in a number of different ways. The 
first of these was through its adoption and modification in the Cabinet Manual. 
6 
Simon James British Cabinet Covem111e11t (2 Ed, Routledge, London and New York 1999) 6 - 7. 
7 K. J Scott The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1962) 113. 
7 
E Cabinet Office Manual Prior to 1996 
The Cabinet Office Manual, and any amendments by Cabinet Office Circular, has 
provides authoritative guidance on the expectations of the conduct of Cabinet since it was 
first compiled in 1949. The Cabinet Office Manual did not, however, refer to the 
requirement to resign until 1983, 8 shortly after the first enforced resignation under the 
auspices of collective responsibility in over 50 years. 
The Cabinet Office Manual has been regularly revised since it was introduced, with a 
significant update occurring in 1996 in preparation for coalition government. The 1996 
edition reinforced the importance of collective responsibility in the following section 
appropriately headed Collective Responsibility: 9 
3.4 Decisions at Cabinet and Cabinet committee meetings are usually reached by 
consensus. Votes are rarely taken. Once a decision has been made, however, it is to be 
supported collectively by all Ministers, regardless of their personal views and whether or not 
they were at the meeting concerned. 
3.5 The convention of collective responsibility is an essential underpinning of the 
system of Cabinet government, whereby Ministers are required to advise the Sovereign (in 
practice, the Governor-General) on matters of public impo11ance. Ministers whose 
opposition to a Cabinet decision is such that they wish to publicly dissociate themselves from 
it must first resign from the Cabinet. 
F Practical Impact of the Convention 
The consequence of departures from the unanimity and confidentiality elements is that 
the minister who breaches the convention should resign or be dismissed. In reality, 
however, a number of factors will dete1mine whether this occurs. It is also difficult, in 
this context, to separate actions during the process that leads to a Cabinet decision being 
made from the actions which follow that decision being made. While actions during the 
decision making process may more appropriately be viewed as being subject to the 
confidentiality element, the public voicing of opinions prior to a decision being made can 
signal an intention to breach the unanimity element. 
III IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT AND 
MMP ON THE CONVENTION OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
The introduction of coalition government under the MMP electoral system in 1996 
involved a significant change to the operation of governments in New Zealand. The 
moving from a system of single-party governments, to one where conflicting interests 
would need to be managed within a coalition govenunent, was expected to place pressure 
on the boundaries of collective responsibility. 
The introduction of coalition government also led to the introduction of coalition 
agreements. The two coalition agreements since 1996, those of the National/NZ First and 
8 Gordon Campbell "Cabinet Making" The Listener, New Zealand, 11 December 1999, 16, 17. 
9 Cabinet Office Manual, Cabinet Office (I 996) 36. 
8 
Labour/ Alliance government, have taken markedly different approaches to how they 
dealt with the likely pressures on collective responsibilities. 
This part discusses the following matters, to give further background into the discussion 
of evidence that follows in Parts V and VI: 
• commentary on the likely impact of the introduction of coalition government; 
• the National/ NZ First coalition agreement; 
• the Labour/ Alliance coalition agreement; 
• the revision of the Cabinet Manual in 2001; 
• the current status of the convention of collective responsibility; and 
• commentary from the Secretary of the Cabinet on the impact of coalition government 
on the convention of collective responsibility. 
A Commentary on the Likely Impact of Coalition Government 
Boston noted, prior to the introduction of coalition government, that while collective 
responsibility was likely to continue to underpin New Zealand's cabinet system of 
government there were also likely to be significant challenges for the members of those 
governments: 10 
Collective responsibility is an important doctrine in all systems of cabinet 
government. This is hardly suprising because there are powerful political incentives for a 
gove1m11ent to present a united face to the country, and equally strong incentives for 
ministers to defend the government when it is under opposition attack. At the same tin1e, 
disagreements between the coalition partners may well be aired more often in public than is 
the case with respect to factional disputes in single-party govetmnents. Equally important, 
the doctrine of collective responsibility is likely to be severely tested in the period leading up 
to an election, since there will be strong political pressures for each party in the coalition to 
distinguish its policies and philosophy from that of its partners. 
B National/NZ First Coalition Agreement11 
The 1996 General Election resulted in a delicate balance of power being held by the NZ 
First party, with the parties of the left (Labour and Alliance) and the parties of the right 
(National and Act) tmable to form a government without the support of NZ First. 
Negotiations over the formation of a coalition government focused on two-party 
coalitions between Labour and NZ First, and National and NZ First, with both coalitions 
10 Johnathon Boston "The future of cabinet government in New Zealand: The implications of MMP for the 
formation, organization and operations of the cabinet" Working Paper Series 3/94 Graduate School of 
Business and Government Management (I 994) GSBGM Research Publications Series, Victoria University 
of Wellington. 
11 Rt Hon .J B Bolger and Hon Winston Peters, This Agreement made this 11 th day of December 1996 
Between New Zealand First Political Party registered under the Electoral Act 1993 (hereafter referred to as 
'New Zealand First") and the New Zea land National Party duly registered under the Electoral Act 1993 
(hereafter referred to as National) (Wellington, 11 December 1996) (hereafter National/NZ First Coalition 
Agreement). 
9 
being capable of governing without the support of the respective minor parties of the left 
and right. 
Public surprise greeted the formation of the National/NZ First coalition government, 
given that NZ First had campaigned against the policies of the National Party. This may 
have reflected the degree of policy commitment that was contained in the coalition 
agreement, as well as the number of ministers that NZ First were to have and the 
positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer that NZ First's leader, Rt Hon Winston 
Peters, was appointed to. 
Significantly, for the purposes of this paper, the National/NZ First Coalition Agreement 
explicitly acknowledged the continuing relevance of collective responsibility, stating that 
"The established conventions of collective responsibility and confidentiality are 
accepted." 12 It also provided for the minimal change to the process of decision making, 
stating that "It is agreed that every endeavour shall be made for decision making in 
Cabinet to be on a consensus basis." 13 
The mam1er in which those conventions were intended to apply largely endorsed previous 
practice. as contained in the Cabinet Office Manual at that time: 14 
All members appointed to the Executive shall ... comply with the requirements of the 
Cabinet Office Manual (August 1996) and associated Cabinet Office circulars and will accept 
the conventions of Cabinet responsibility and Cabinet confidentiality save and except as 
otherwise provided for in this agreement. 
While the National/NZ First coalition generally accepted collective responsibility, this 
needs to be viewed in the context of the degree of policy agreement contained in their 
coalition agreement. The specificity of the Schedule to that agreement had a significant 
impact on the dynamics of the cabinet process and the operation of collective 
responsibility. 
By emphasising the value of stability of previous policy, unless there was subsequent 
amendments either through that Schedule or agreement in Cabinet, the negotiating 
positions of each party were constrained in advance. While NZ First opted for a degree 
of stability, requiring their support for previous ational policy, the agreed positions in 
the Schedule also bound National to a significant proportion of NZ First's policy. 
Any dispute between the coalition partners over policy in Cabinet would then need to be 
dealt with first by reference back to the Coalition Agreement and its Schedule. The 
provisions of the agreement dealing with coalition management indicated that the 
coalition was aware of the need to deal with disputes, including those that could 
challenge the agreed observance of collective responsibility. 
12 National/NZ First Coalition Agreement clause 7.6. 
13 National/NZ First Coalition Agreement clause 7.5. 
14 National/NZ First Coalition Agreement clause 7 .3( d). 
10 
C Labour/Alliance Coalition Agreement1 5 
By contrast, the Labour and Alliance parties entered into a coalition arrangement 
extremely smoothly following the 1999 General Election. The smoothness of this 
process may have reflected a desire not to repeat the protracted process of three years 
prior, and an intent to have a less complex coalition agreement. The first of these 
elements may also reflected the relationship that existed between the coalition partners, 
having worked together as a virtual coalition opposition over the previous six years . The 
second of these elements may have reflected the degree of similarity between the 
positions of the Labour and Alliance paiiies on a number of key policy positions. 
These similarities may have provided the Labour and Alliance parties with greater 
confidence to enter into a coalition agreement that reflected high level principles rather 
than specific policy commitments, leaving detailed policy positions to be negotiated 
within the Cabinet process and enforced through collective responsibility. The 
Labour/ Alliance Coalition Agreement is merely 2 pages long and contains four key 
elements. 
The most relevant element is the process for coalition management. This included the 
appointment of a coalition management committee and the endorsement of the continuing 
relevance of collective responsibility: 16 
The coalition government will operate within the convention of collective cabinet 
responsibility, subject to the provisions of this agreement, and the expectation is that cabinet 
decisions will be taken by consensus. 
The Coalition Agreement recognises, however, that there may be areas where the parties 
would not be able to agree and provides a process to deal with those situations: 17 
Where either party leader considers that a distinctive policy matter raises an issue of 
importance to the party 's political identity, the leader will raise this with the coalition 
management committee which will resolve an appropriate course of action, including 
possibly identifying the matter as one of "party distinction". In this event there may be public 
differentiation between the parties in speech and vote which will not be regarded as being in 
breach of the convention. Such issues are expected to be infrequent and the parties recognise 
that dealing with them openly and responsibly is critical to the credibility of the coalition. 
Differentiation on such issues will not detract from the overall acceptance that the two parties 
are taking joint responsibility for the actions of the government. 
The remaining key elements in the Coalition Agreement are the broad objectives that the 
coalition government committed to operate under, the processes for the formation of 
policy that builds upon both parties electoral platforms and the number of Ministers that 
will be appointed from each party to the coalition. 
15 "The Coalition Agreement between the Labour and Alliance Parties" 6 December 1999 (hereafter 
Labour/ Alliance Coalition Agreement). 
16 Labour/Alliance Coalition Agreement, 1. 
17 Labour/Alliance Coalition Agreement, I. 
11 
D Revisio1t of the Cabinet Ma1tual (2001) 
The Labour / Alliance Coalition Agreement also signalled that a review of the Cabinet 
Office Manual would occur, stating that "The cabinet office manual will be reviewed 
within the first six months of office to ensure its procedures effectively facilitate the 
management of the coalition govemment."
18 
The intent was that this process would give effect to the convention, as it was recognised 
within the Labour/ Alliance Coalition Agreement, however, the process of revising the 
Cabinet Manual proved to be both long and difficult. Rather than being completed within 
the first six months of the Government's tem1, it took from December 1999 until April 
2001 for the completely revised Cabinet Manual to be produced and approved by 
Cabinet. 19 
The process of deciding on changes commenced with a Cabinet paper
20 on 13 December 
1999, just one week after the Coalition agreement had been signed. Cabinet agreed to a 
recommendation inviting: 21 
the Prime Minister, in consultation with other Ministers as appropriate, to review the 
Cabinet Office Manual, and report back to Cabinet no later than 30 June 2000, including in 
the report: 
proposals for amending the current provisions in the Cabinet Office Manual concerning 
collective responsibility, to ensure that the collective responsibility provisions in the 
Cabinet Office Manual do not conflict with the "party distinction" process set out in the 
Coalition Agreement; ... 
The proposed changes were considered a number of times
22
, before finally being agreed 
to by Cabinet on 27 November 2000.
23 Changes relating to collective responsibility 
18 Labour/Alliance Coalition Agreement, 2. 
19 Although the provisions on collective responsibility were agreed to in November 2000 and actioned by 
way of Cabinet Office Circular - see n 24 below. 
20 Memorandum for Cabinet - Coalition Agreement Between the Labour and Alliance Parties and Cabinet 
Office Manual CAB (99) 781 (10 December 1999). 
21 Coalition Agreement Between the Labour and Alliance Parties and Cabinet Office Manual CAB (99) M 
32/2 recommendation f ( 13 December 1999). 
22 The changes were first considered by Cabinet Policy Conm1ittee on 16 August 2000 (see Cabinet Office 
Manual Review: Overview POL(OO) 96 (14 August 2000); Cabinet Office Manual Review: Coalition 
Management POL (00) 97 (14 August 2000); and Cabinet Office Manual Review POL (00) M 22/1 & 2 (16 
August)), which referred consideration of the relevant papers to Cabinet. Cabinet considered those papers 
on 4 September 2000 (see Cabinet Office Manual Review: Overview CAB (00) 578 (31 August 2000); 
Cabinet Office Manual Review: Coalition Management CAB (00) 577 (31 August 2000); and Cabinet 
Office Manual Review: Overview CAB (00) M 29/11 & 12 (4 September 2000)), which deferred 
consideration of the papers to enable the Deputy Prime Minister to undertake further consultation with the 
Alliance caucus. Cabinet Policy Committee next considered these papers, including revised provisions on 
collective responsibility, and agreed on the relevant text to be inserted into the collective responsibility 
sections on 20 September 2000 (see Additional Item: Power to Act: Cabinet Office Manual Review CAB 
(00) M 31/10 (18 September 2000), Cabinet Office Manual Review. Coalition Management: Collective 
Responsibility Text POL (00) 97A (19 September 2000); and Cabinet Office Manual Review: Coalition 
Management POL (00) M 26/ lB (20 September 2000)). The finalised text of these sections was considered 
by Cabinet Policy Committee on 22 ovember (see Cabinet Office Manual: Revision of Chapters I to 3 
12 
were, however, given effect to through a Cabinet Office Circular issued on 3 November 
2000.24 
The Cabinet Manual currently includes the following provisions that provide guidance 
over the rules under which Cabinet operates when making decisions, including provisions 
on collective responsibility that replicate the provisions of the earlier Cabinet Office 
Circular: 25 
3.20 The principle of collective responsibility underpins the system of Cabinet government. 
It reflects democratic principle: the House expresses its confidence in the collective whole of 
government, rather than in individual Ministers. Similarly, the Governor-General, in acting 
on ministerial advice, needs to be confident that individual Ministers represent official 
government policy. In all areas of their work, therefore, Ministers represent and implement 
government policy. 
3.21 Acceptance of ministerial office requires acceptance of collective responsibility. Issues 
are often debated vigorously within the confidential setting of Cabinet meetings , although 
consensus is usually reached and votes are rarely taken. Once Cabinet makes a decision, then 
( except as provided in paragraph 3 .23) Ministers must support it, regardless of their personal 
views and whether or not they were at the meeting concerned. 
3.22 In a coalition government, Ministers are expected to show careful judgement when 
referring to party policy that differs from government policy. Subject to paragraph 3.23, a 
Minister 's support and responsibility for the collective government position must always be 
clear. 
3.23 Coalition governments may decide to establish "agree to disagree" processes, which 
may allow Ministers to maintain, in public, different pa1ty positions on particular issues or 
policies. Once the final outcome of any "agree to disagree" issue or policy has been 
determined ( either at the Cabinet level or through some other agreed process), Ministers must 
implement the resulting decision or legislation, regardless of their position throughout the 
decision making process. 
3.24 "Agree to disagree" processes may only be used in re lation to different party positions. 
Any public dissociation from Cabinet decisions by individual Ministers outside the agreed 
processes is unacceptable. 
E Commentary from the Secretary of tile Cabinet 
The comments of Boston that started this Part suggested that MMP and coalition 
government were likely to severely test collective responsibility. While that may have 
occurred during the term of the National/NZ First coalition government, that need not be 
the case. The view from of Marie Shroff, Secretary of the Cabinet is that, while coalition 
government may have increased the pressure on collective responsibility, this does not 
POL (00) 186 Rev 1 (17 November 2000); and Cabinet Office Manual: Revision of Chapters 1 to 3 POL 
(00) M 33/1 (22 November 2000)) . 
23 These changes were finally endorsed by Cabinet on 27 November 2000 (see Cabinet Office Manual: 
Revision of Chapters 1 to 3 CAB (00) 772 (23 November 2000); and Cabinet Office Manual: Revision of 
Chapters I to 3 CAB (00) M 39/9 (27 November 2000)). 
24 Coalition Management - Amendments to Cabinet Office Manual CO (00) 10, Cabinet Office, Wellington 
(3 November 2000). 
25 Cabinet Manual, Cabinet Office (2001) Wellington. 
mean that it can not be preserved: 26 
The introduction of proportional representation in ew Zealand increased the pressure 
on collective responsibility, because there are sometimes considerable incentives for smaller 
parties to let their constituencies know when they have fought and lost on a particular issue in 
Cabinet. ... 
On the other hand, collective responsibility - i.e. unitary government - remains a foundation 
stone of Cabinet government, even under MMP . ... 
The challenge, therefore, for those seeking stable coalition governments, is to find a line 
between the overall need for unitary government (via collective responsibility) and the needs 
of smaller coalition partners to retain their distinct identities. 
Shroff cites the "agree to differ" mechanism adopted by the Labour/ Alliance 
government as an example of how those pressures can be balanced:
27 
The development of the "agree to disagree" mechanism in the Labour/Alliance 
coalition agreement is a response to the desire for small party branding of its policies. The 
Labour/Alliance mechanism provides for a relaxation of the unanimity principle, on rare 
occasions, within a constrained, transparent and carefully regulated context. Indeed, if 
Cabinet agrees to disagree, then the differentiation is arguably contained within the overall 
bounds of collective responsibility as the issues on which the parties may agree to disagree 
must themselves be collectively mandated. 
I do not see the mechanism as an erosion of collective responsibility, although it certainly 
marks an evolution. It is even possible that collective responsibility will be strengthened as a 
result of the mechanism, because dissent by individual Ministers outside the authorised 
process is clearly not envisaged. 
F Current Status of Convention of Collective Responsibility 
13 
The changes over the past five years have left some elements of collective responsibility 
undisturbed, while also subtly modifying the convention. The key element that has 
remained the same is the obligation on Ministers to resign where they wish to dissociate 
themselves from a Cabinet decision that they are unable to support, supported by the 
continued practice of Cabinet generally attempt to reach agreement on all issues. 
The most significant change has been the formal introduction of the ability for Ministers 
to publicly disagree, albeit through the constrained methods of the "agree to disagree" 
mechanism. This mechanism is likely to be invaluable to the extent that it maintains 
individual pa1iies' ability to have separate identity, effectively acting as a fuse-box 
preventing the complete melt-down ofrelations within a cabinet. 
This mechanism is, however, cleverly tempered by the requirement that cabinet agree 
when to disagree, providing for the collective mandate of disagreement described by 
26 Cabinet Office "Notes for Marie Shroff for Select Committee hearing" 16 March 2000. 
27 Slu·off, Marie "The Role of the Secretary of the Cabinet: The View from the Beehive ", Speech delivered 
at New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 31 July 2001, pages 17 - 18. 
Forthcoming publication as ZCPL occasional paper. 
14 
Shroff. As such it may truly be seen as an evolution of collective responsibility, rather 
than a reduction. 
IV FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
This Part examines breaches of the convention of collective responsibility against a range 
of factors identified below, in an attempt to describe either the reasoning for the doctrine 
being enforced or for a breach being tolerated. The focus of the paper is on breaches of 
the unanimity element of the convention, as the element that most commonly is breached 
or appears under threat of breach. 28 
A Framework for Analysis and Methodology 
This section attempts to establish a framework for analysing the enforcement of the 
convention of collective responsibility by identifying evidence that can support general 
statements about the politics of enforcing this convention. The framework and 
methodology used is similar to that Laver and Shepsle applied in analysing the formation 
and maintenance of governments. The basic principle of Laver and Shepsle's analysis 
was as follows: 29 
Our most fundamental premise is that it is possible to make general statements about 
the politics of building and maintaining a government, and that such general statements can 
give us valuable insights into the political processes involved. 
B Factors for Analysing Breaches oftlie Convention 
The framework that utilised builds upon work of Alderman and Cross30 on the factors that 
may influence a Minister's choice over whether they resign or the Prime Minister's 
decision over whether they dismiss. Aldennan and Cross discussed these factors in the 
context of threats by a Minister that they will resign, in an attempt to achieve an outcome 
that a Minister is supporting. They are equally applicable, however, to a Minister's 
actions beyond the point at which a decision is taken, in terms of their canying out a 
tlu·eat to speak against a collective Cabinet decision. Once the Minister acts upon their 
28 The unaninlity element can, however, come under threat of breach contemporaneously or in connection 
with threats to breach the confidentiality element. For example, following Douglas' resignation in 1988, he 
released Cabinet papers without authorisation. Such a situation where both elements are breached is most 
likely to occur where a Minister is unable to support a Cabinet position and releases papers in an attempt to 
gain greater support for the position that they have taken. Where Minister has already resigned or been 
dismissed, and they then breach the confidentiality element, there are unlikely to be any clear sanctions for 
their breach - see (1989) 500 NZPD 11702 where the then Attorney General Rt. Hon Geoffrey Palmer 
stated in response to an oral question "In any event, the actions of a former Cabinet Minister in disclosing 
Cabinet minutes are unlawful in the sense that to do so breaches the constitutional convention of Cabinet 
confidentiality. Such a disclosure may well be actionable in the civil law, but that does not me:in that it is 
an offence for which a prosecution could be bought." 
29 Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures 
in Parliamenta,y Democracies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
30 R.K. Alderman and J.A. Cross The tactics of re ignatio11 : A study in British Cabinet Government 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967). 
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tlrreat they are bound by the Convention to resign or can be dismissed by the Prime 
Minister. 
The factors are: 
» relative indispensability - the more senior a Minister is the greater the latitude they 
will have to challenge policy within Cabinet, to threaten to breach the unanimity 
element and to survive a breach of that element; 
» external indispensability - a Minister's value to the Cabinet based upon the 
importance of their constituency to the Cabinet may influence their ability to threaten 
to breach the convention, especially where their constituency has a significant interest 
in the issue over which the Minister is making the threat; 
» colleague's belief in the seriousness of the threat - Ministers will have greater 
latitude where they threaten to breach the convention over an issues which they have 
a significant stake in or where the other members of Cabinet are convinced of the 
seriousness of their threat (either because the Minister does not lightly make threats 
of that nature or because they have carried out such threats in the past); 
» group threats or repeated threats - a group of Ministers who collectively make a 
threat may have greater power to survive the breach of the convention or to negotiate 
a right to breach (for example, the "agree to disagree" agreements). Alternatively, a 
Minister may utilise repeat threats over a particular issue to demonstrate the 
seriousness of those threats or the significance of their beliefs in that issue, so they 
can survive the actual breach; 
» ability to enlist outside support - a Minister may have greater latitude to breach the 
convention where they are able to generate significant external public support for 
their position, especially where that support is wider than their own constituency; and 
» circumstances and timing - Ministers may also be able to survive breaches where 
they make the breach in circumstances that are acceptable to Cabinet (for example, by 
floating their own concerns over Cabinet's decision where Cabinet itself is relatively 
divided over an issue, or where there is a strong sense of morality involved in the 
issue). Alternatively, the timing of a breach within the electoral cycle may make it 
more acceptable (for example, where it is part of the positioning of Coalition partners 
on policy issues immediately after or prior to an election, when partners are tussling 
to exert their influence or to position themselves for future influence.) 
C Enforcement 
A key factor, which is not clearly addressed above, is whether the requirement to resign 
will be enforced by the Prime Minister, or whether will Minister feel significantly 
compelled to voluntarily resign. In that context, whether resignation is required or 
dismissal will occur is likely to be affected by the personal style of the Prime Minister, 
which has a significant impact on the extent of behaviour that is acceptable, and the Party 
that is in Government. 
Rather than attempting to control for the personal style of different Prime Ministers and 
administrations, this fonn of analysis enables the focus to be on the characteristics of 
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behaviour. This form of analysis should enable consideration, under the last of the above 
characteristics, of the impact of 'political realities' . These are, in practice, more likely to 
impact on the likelihood that certain behaviour would be subject to the sanction of 
resignation / dismissal than the other variables that can be assigned to the behaviour. 
The difference in methods of electing Cabinet members for the Labour and National 
parties will also be considered, due to the impact this difference has on the practicalities 
of enforcement by the Prime Minister of the obligation to resign. Labour Prime Ministers 
can generally be seen to be more constrained due to the fact that their caucus can re-elect 
a Minister that has been dismissed by the Prime Minister, whereas National Prime 
Ministers have more power over the membership of their Cabinet. 
In addition, consideration will be given to the extent to which a potential future breach 
has been explicitly sanctioned in advance within Coalition Agreements, or the Prime 
Minister's ability to dismiss has constrained. As examples of this, the Labour/Alliance 
Coalition Agreement provides the "agree to disagree" mechanism, as well as specifying 
that the power to dismiss Alliance Ministers resides with the Alliance Party Leader rather 
than the Prime Minister. 
Finally, it should be noted that while the convention is theoretically applicable to all 
Ministers, there may be difficulties in enforcing it where the Minister who breaches the 
convention is also responsible for its enforcement, in their role as Prime Minister. James, 
in the context of Margaret Thatcher's loose observance of the convention in the United 
Kingdom remarked that "The Cabinet is not just a mechanism for taking decisions: it is a 
means for nurturing political loyalty between colleagues. The Prime Minister, as 
chainnan and leader, cannot afford to neglect this side of its work .... "31 
This suggests that while there may be practical difficulties in enforcing the convention 
against the Prime Minister, due to their position as first among equals, it should still be 
considered to be binding on them. Ultimately, the sanction for the Prime Minister who 
breaches the convention repeatedly may be, however, essentially political in nature, as 
members of their own party seek to restrain their actions in other ways. 
V EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The evidence described in this Part should provide valuable insights into the likely 
method in which the convention will be enforced in the future. While the introduction of 
coalition government has modified the political landscape markedly, it should still be 
possible to make predictions about how the convention will be enforced in the future 
based on previous behaviour. 
Part VI draws general statements from the evidence presented in this Part. It does, 
however, attempt to also recognise the changes that coalition management processes will 
have had on how the convention will be enforced in the future. 
31 Above n 6, 187. 
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A Division of Evidence 
Instances of breaches of the convention have been identified both from texts and 
newspaper reports, dating back to 1932. Some of the actions identified fall into what will 
be described as "grey areas" where it is unclear whether the convention has been 
breached, and hence whether the sanction of dismissal would be appropriate (for 
example, unauthorised statements prior to Cabinet decisions being taken). The 
observations are broken into the following time periods: 
~ evidence from prior to 1984 
~ evidence from the Labour Government 1984 - 1990 
~ evidence from the National Government 1990 - 1996 
~ evidence from National / NZ First Coalition Government 1996 - 1998 
~ evidence from National / Mauri Pacific Minority Coalition Government 1998 - 1999 
>- evidence from Labour / Alliance Minority Government 1999 - 2001 
These breaches are then examined in Table One to identify the extent to which the 
following characteristics ( discussed in the previous section) form a part of the breach or 
the individual Minister ( or Ministers) who committed the breach: 
~ indispensability - including both relative and / or external indispensability; 
~ nature of the breach - including colleague's belief in the seriousness of the threat, and 
whether the threat is a group threat or repeated threat; 
~ ability to enlist outside support; and 
~ circumstances and timing. 
B Evidence Prior to 1984 
Seven clear examples of breaches of the convention can be identified in the period prior 
to 1984. Both of the first two breaches involved the then Minister of Finance Hon. 
William Downie Stewart. 
1 Downie Stewart 
The first of these breaches, in 1932, involved Downie Stewart's disagreement with 
Cabinet's decision to reduce rents and interest rates. This breach occuned against a 
back-drop of Downie Stewart having successfully spoken against a reduction in rents and 
interest rates the previous year, at the time that wages had been reduced. 
In the case of this breach, Downie Stewart not only disagreed with the Cabinet decision 
during Cabinet consideration, but also criticised the policy publicly following that 
decision and voted against the policy when it was put into place through the National 
Expenditure Adjustment Act. This depai1ure from the convention is particularly notable 
for the fact that Downie Stewart was, as Minister of Finance, responsible for this area of 
policy. Downie Stewart did not resign, and there was a subsequent public announcement 
made that Cabinet had 'agreed to differ' in relation to this policy. 
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An examination of this breach suggests that Downie Stewart's successful breach of the 
convention occurred for the following reasons. First, as Minister of Finance Downie 
Stewart occupied a senior position within the Forbes Coalition Government, being the 3rd 
or 4th ranked Minister. His position was, therefore, strengthened by the potentially 
serious consequences of the Forbes dismissing him, in terms of the significant 
embarrassment that would have caused the Government (although Downie Stewart's 
breach in itself was also a cause of significant embarrassment to the Government). 
Second, Downie Stewart's previous opposition to this and connected policies probably 
strengthened his position, in terms of his threat to breach the convention being more 
credible with his colleagues. Downie Stewart had consistently spoken against measures 
taken in response to the serious economic conditions at that time. In particular, Downie 
Stewart had argued for relief for a range of lower income earners, during a period where 
the Government had pursued policies that were reflected in the AJ:bitration Court ordering 
a reduction in wages of 10%. The key issue for Downie Stewart appears to have been the 
need to respond in a fair manner to the Government deficits that were caused by the 
Depression. 
Finally, Downie Stewart's position was also strengthened by the fact that he was the sole 
urban Minister in a coalition Cabinet dominated by country Reform Party Ministers. As 
such, his presence in the coalition Government was beneficial for maintaining a more 
representative Government, due to the support that he may have been able to bring from 
urban constituents. 
These factors can collectively be seen as having contributed to the compromise solution 
of the announcement that Cabinet had 'agreed to differ' in relation to this policy. 
Without such a solution being reached, the embarrassment to the Government would no 
doubt have been significantly greater. 
The second clear breach of the convention by Downie Stewart occurred in 1933, and 
related to his disagreement with the raising of the exchange rate and the granting of 
indemnities for banks against the impact of the exchange rate changes. This policy was a 
response to the lack of profitability of the farn1ing sector, following the Depression, and 
aimed to respond to low export prices by raising the exchange rate from 110% to 125%. 
Again, this breach is notable for it falling ostensibly within the realms of Downie 
Stewaii's responsibilities. On this occasion Downie Stewart chose to resign in 
accordance with the convention. Following his resignation on 28 January, Downie 
Stewart not only spoke at length in opposition to the policy32 , but also voted against the 
second reading of the Bank Indemnity (Exchange) Bill. 33 
While this appears to demonstrate the seriousness of Downie Stewart's concerns over the 
economic, wages and incomes policies of the Forbes Government, it highlights the fact 
32 (1933) 235 NZPD 63-9. 
33 Above n32, 236. 
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that where a Minister's concerns are sufficiently serious, then they will eventually be 
forced to carry out a threat to resign to demonstrate the seriousness of their view. In 
other words, where a Minister is unable to muster sufficient support, either within 
Cabinet, the Govenunent or publicly, to justify their position, then unless there are other 
extenuating circumstances, they will be forced to resign. 
It is interesting to note that, in respect of Downie Stewart's breaches of the convention, 
Scott noted that the agreement to differ could be "regarded as a constitutional experiment 
that was unsuccessful and is unlikely to be repeated."34 Subsequent events have, 
although many years later, demonstrated the political desirability of not only providing 
for an agreement to disagree, but also of formally elevating that to be potentially the most 
significant tool for managing the pressures of Coalition Government. 
2 Algie and Broadfoot 
Following Downie Stewart's breaches there was a significant period where the 
convention does not appear to have been seriously challenged. The next instance of a 
breach of the convention was by the then Minister of Education Hon. Ronald Algie35 in 
1953. Again, this breach related to the Minister's own portfolio, and in this case involved 
Algie arguing in the Address-in-Reply debate for the raising of a special loan for 
educational purposes36, which Cabinet had already disagreed with. 
Later in that year, a finiher breach of the convention occurred when the Postmaster-
General, Hon. Walter Broadfoot37 , voiced his disagreement with transfer of certain profits 
of the Post and Telegraph Department to the Consolidated Account. Once again, this 
breach involved a Minister disagreeing with policy in the area of their own portfolio 
responsibilities, with Broadfoot voicing his disapproval on the occasion of his 
introducting of the Post and Telegraph Amendment Bill. 38 
Following these breaches neither Algie nor Broadfoot resign, and neither Minister was 
dismissed by the then Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sid Holland. This can be seen as 
being largely a consequence of the circumstances in which the breaches occurred, as 
neither Minister argued their position strenuously. Rather, the breaches appear to have 
been minor expressions of frustration over the Ministers failing to convince their 
colleagues to agree with their positions. Scott notes that these breaches did "little or no 
harm"39 as they merely represented a manifestation of the Ministers' enthusiasm for their 
own departments. This suggests that these breaches can be viewed as having been 
34 Above n 7, 115. 
35 5th ranked Minister in Holland's National Government. 
36 Algie considered that a loan was necessary to adequately meet the rapidly growing needs of the 
education sector, including to provide for capital expansion - (17 April 1953) 299 NZPD 122-5. 
37 8th ranked Minister in Holland ' s National Government. 
38 Broadfoot considered that insufficient money had been set aside over a period of time by the Post and 
Telegraph Department for renewals of its networks, which had resulted in the Department needing to 
borrow a considerable amount of money - (16 October 1953) 300 NZPD 1879. 
39 Above n 7, 114. 
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implicitly sanctioned as a consequence of their colleagues acknowledging their 
significant interest in the policies which affected their own departments. 
3 Goosman 
The next incidence of breach of the convention involved the then Minister of Works, Hon 
William Goosman40 , who in 1957 expressed his disagreement with allocation of radio 
time prior to an election to the Social Credit party, on the basis that he considered their 
policies were "unsound."41 Goosman had spoken against Social Credit's policies at 
length during the Address in Reply debate, particularly in relation to their economic 
policies and their view of the operation of the banking system. 42 
Goosman did not resign, claiming that he was expressing a personal opinion rather than 
breaching the convention. This breach, and the matter that it related to, can potentially be 
seen as being implicitly accepted by the then Prime Minister Holland, due to its timing 
before the election. While Goosman was claiming personal opinion, this opinion would 
no doubt have been beneficial to the Government, in terms of its being part of the normal 
criticism of other parties' policies which accompanies most elections. 
This suggests that Goosman may also have been able to survive this breach based on his 
having some degree of ability to enlist external support. While it is patently 
undemocratic to suggest that another political party should be handicapped in their 
attempts to publicise their policies, Holland could have suffered far greater consequences 
had he chosen to dismiss Goosman for the breach of the consequences and then made 
similar criticisms of the Social Credit Pa1iy as a part of his own electioneering. 
4 Couch 
Following Goosman's breach, there was again a significant period of time where the 
convention does not appear to have been significantly challenged. The next clear 
instance of a breach involved the then Minister of Maori Affairs and Police, Hon. Ben 
Couch 43, who in 1981 openly opposed the Government policy of discouraging sporting 
contacts with South Africa. 
Couch's statements included cntlc1sm of the State Services Commission's policy of 
refusing to grant leave to public servants to play sport with South Africans, a policy 
which was intended to give effect to the Government's commitment to the Gleneagles 
agreement on sporting contacts with South Africa.44 Couch's position was criticised as 
40 5th ranked Minister in Holland's National Govemment. 
41 Scott paraphrases as "nonsense [that] if put into practice would ruin the country" - see above n 7, 114. 
42 (20 June 1957) 311 NZPD 201-5. 
43 18 th ranked Minister in the Muldoon ational Govenunent. 
44 Couch did, however, voted for a number of Govenunent motions relating to the giving effect of the 
Gleneagles agreement. Notably one of these simultaneously recognised the Govenunent's disapproval of 
the NZRFU allowing the tour to go ahead, as well as acknowledging that the Govemment would grant 
visas to the South African rugby players and encouraging any protestors to only undertake "peaceful 
protest" - see (19 June 1981) 437 NZPD 602-28. 
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being contrary to the Government's position by the then Minister of State Services, Hon 
David Thomson. However, the then Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon, did not request 
Couch's resignation. 
This breach of the convention may have been tolerated for a range of reasons, including 
the strong sense of personal morality involved in Couch's views on both apartheid and 
sporting contacts with South Africa. Muldoon had also previously personally supported 
Springbok tours, so dismissing Couch for expressing his personal opinion may have 
involved some risk that Muldoon would have been criticised for hypocrisy 
(notwithstanding the fact that he could have justified his actions as being required by the 
convention, and his own support for the Government's policy as being required for the 
same reason) . Finally, the overall diversity of public opinion over the appropriateness of 
sporting contacts with South Africa probably contributed to a view that some 
disagreement within Cabinet was acceptable (as a reflection of society itself). 45 
5 Quigley 
Shortly after Couch's actions, Muldoon was less accommodating in relation to a breach 
by the then Minister of Works and Development, Hon. Derek Quigle/6, in 1982. 
Quigley criticised the Government's 'Think Big' policy on infrastructure development a 
number of times, including in a speech to the Young Nationals. Following this Quigley 
choose not to act on Muldoon's request that he attempt to stop the Dominion newspaper 
from publishing the text of his speech, and then defied Muldoon in appearing on the 
News makers television programme to justify his earlier statements in the Young 
Nationals speech. 
Muldoon requested a public apology from 
apologised he would be required to resign. 
statements, instead resigning on 14 June 1982. 
Quigley, and indicated that unless he 
Quigley chose not to resile from his 
While Quigley's resignation at the time was consistently described in newspaper reports 
as being a consequence of collective responsibility, there are a number of factors that 
suggest it Quigley's actions may not have amounted to a breach of the convention.47 
The first factor is whether Quigley's speech actually challenged the fundamental policy 
elements that had been agreed to by Cabinet, or if it simply focussed on a lack of clarity 
over what was meant by "Think Big". Quigley also discussed whether the overall focus 
of the government's growth strategy required the continuation of the level of state 
45 For the differing views see "Labour Calls For Mr Couch To Go Or Be Dropped" New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 17 June 1980, page 5, section 1; "Mr Couch Faces Cries of 'Racist"' New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 20 June 1980, page 1, section 1; and "Mr Couch Wins Sympathy 
From Majority of Letter Writers" ew Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 20 June 1980, page 20, 
section I. 
46 10th ranked Minister in Muldoon ' s National Government. 
47 This view was also publicly stated by members of the National Party machinery at the time of Quigley 's 
resignation - see "Quigley 'Sacking' Has Party in Turmoil" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 
16 June 1982, page 1, section 1. 
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intervention in the economy that was present at that time, and the consistency of "Think 
Big" with differing levels of state intervention.48 These comments are similar in nature, 
therefore, to those a year earlier of Couch over apartheid and the Springbok rugby tour, in 
tem1s of their reflecting public debate and uncertainty. 
The second factor relates to the strained nature of the relationship between Quigley and 
Muldoon at the time, due to Quigley's participation in a failed leadership challenge 
against Muldoon in 1980. Muldoon's perception that Quigley's actions amounted to a 
direct challenge to his authority, given Muldoon's personal connection to 'Think Big', 
combined to make Quigley's continued presence as a Minister untenable after the breach. 
In combination, these factors would support the view that Quigley's resignation was not a 
clear-cut case of collective responsibility being breached. Ultimately, Quigley's stance 
was probably justified by the effective dismantling of the "Think Big" projects and the 
dramatic shift away from that form of State intervention in the economy that occurred 
over the following 15 years. Quigley's stance can also be seen as reflecting a personal 
opinion that may have been justified on the grounds of his ability to enlist outside support 
for his position (based on the key position that economic and social policy played in both 
the 1981 and 1984 elections). 
C Evidence from Labour Government 1984 - 1990 
Perhaps remarkably the Labour Governments of 1984 to 1990 enjoyed a number of years 
without any clear breach of the convention. The relative unanimity of this Government is 
interesting given the rapid degree of policy change that occurred during the first tem1 of 
the Rt. Hon. David Lange's administration, under the then troika of finance related 
Ministers, Hon. Roger Douglas, Hon. Richard Prebble and Hon. David Caygill. 49 
The appearance of unanimity can, however, be viewed largely as an illusion masking the 
struggles that were occurring within Cabinet, but behind the mask of collective 
responsibility. A number of times during this period Lange strongly emphasised the 
value that the Labour Cabinet placed on the convention of collective responsibility. 50 
The mask was eventually shattered, however, by a number of breaches of the convention, 
in reasonably rapid succession and all related to economic policy issues. 
I Lange 
The first breach of the convention is interesting, as it involved the then Prime Minister 
Lange. In his now famous "tea-break" speech of 28 January 1988, Lange publicly 
48 "Mr Quigley's Resignation Major Crisis For National" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 15 
June 1982, page 1, section 1. 
49 Respectively 4th, 5th and 7th ranked Ministers in the Lange Labour Government. 
50 In response to an oral question from Doug Kidd on 19 November 1987, Lange stated that the convention 
of collective responsibility continued to apply to the Labour Cabinet - see (1987) 484 NZPD 1135. On 7 
September 1988 Lange issued a press release again stating that Labour Ministers agreed to be bound by 
Cabinet decisions and the principles of collective responsibility - see reference in an oral question by the 
then Hon Bill Birch, (14 September 1988) 492 NZPD 6525. 
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announced deferral of the Government's flat-rate tax policy. This policy had been agreed 
to by Cabinet, partially as a response to the economic conditions after the 1987 stock-
market crash and partially as a part of the package of ongoing economic reforms, and 
announced on 17 December 1987. Lange's deferral of this policy occurred prior to any 
Cabinet reconsideration of the policy, during the Parliamentary Christmas recess . 
This breach is most interesting due to the fact that it was the Prime Minister who 
breached the convention. It raises, therefore, the interesting issue of who would be able 
to enforce the requirement of resignation following such a breach. In this context, 
Lange's seniority meant that he was able to breach the convention, so long as he was still 
supported in his position as Prime Minister. Ultimately, this breach was sanctioned 
retrospectively by Cabinet, although it led to a very public airing of the differences 
between the Cabinet members and threatened to bring down the Government. 
2 Prebble 
The next possible breach of the convention occurred during the power struggle within the 
Labour Government's Cabinet that followed Lange's statement. While the flat-tax policy 
had been deferred, the overall economic policy of the Government continued to involve 
ongoing economic reforms including proposals for a number of further sales of State 
Owned Enterprises within the 1988 Budget. 
Prebble, as the Minister of State Owned Enterprises, had been responsible for the process 
of giving effect to those sales, and had been provided with relatively wide ranging 
powers for that purpose. However, there was growing opposition to the proposed sales, 
and Prebble eventually made rather severe criticisms of the process within which it was 
proposed that he should be required to consult with the Labour Party policy committee 
over asset sales, rather than just his Cabinet colleagues.
51 
At the time of Prebble's criticism, the proposal was one that had been made by Lange and 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Rt. Hon Geoffrey Palmer, but was still subject to Cabinet 
consideration. In the media coverage that followed, both Lange and Prebble breached at 
the very least the confidentiality element of collective responsibility, although to some 
extent these at least some of these breaches appear to have been sanctioned. 
Given that the Cabinet had not reached a final position on this matter, it is difficult to 
argue that Prebble categorically breached the unanimity element of collective 
responsibility. Rather, it could be argued that Lange was in breach, as he was advocating 
very publicly a position that was contrary to earlier Cabinet agreements, even if he was 
actively seeking to ove1iurn those earlier decisions within the bounds of initially 
confidential Cabinet proceedings. 
Lange replaced Prebble as Minister of State Owned Enterprises with Hon. Stan Rodger 
on 4 November 1988. Prebble's response to his replacement was to personally criticise 
5 1 "5.15pm: ' I Am Surprised ' - Prebble" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 5 ovember 1988, 
page 9, section I. 
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Lange's performance as Prime Minister, and authority to dismiss him over a refusal to 
comply with the Prime Minister's proposals on asset sales. 52 Lange dismissed Prebble as 
a Minister the next day, subsequently giving as the reason for Prebble's dismissal the fact 
"that, after consultation, we were unable to agree about the execution of the responsibility 
[that Prebble had as Minister of State Owned Enterprises]."53 It was unclear, therefore, 
whether Prebble's dismissal should be seen as a consequence of collective responsibility 
or merely a pragmatic response by Lange to a difficult situation that had developed 
within the Cabinet and wider Labour party. 
This breach highlights the fact that both group and repeat threats to the unanimity of 
Cabinet may ultimately require dismissal of a Minister, where the position they are taking 
is suggestive of an intent to breach the convention even if it is not clear that a breach has 
actually occtmed. In part, the direct challenge to Lange in itself involved a challenge to 
his indispensability as the most senior Minister, and forced him to act in a manner that 
would maintain both his internal and external support (rather than strictly acting to enlist 
outside support). 
3 Douglas 
In the month that followed the dismissal of Prebble further rifts opened between Douglas 
and Prebble, primarily over economic policy. These differences were largely rooted in 
Lange's over-turning of the flat-tax policy that Cabinet had endorsed the previous year. 
Douglas was also concerned by what he saw as Lange's over-ruling of the collective 
decision making powers of Cabinet, however, the final straw for Douglas was reportedly 
-4 
the refusal by Lange to re-new the employment ofDouglas's press secretary. ) 
Following this Douglas publicly announced that he was no longer willing to work as a 
Minister under Lange. Douglas either resigned or was dismissed55 , and challenged Lange 
for the leadership of the Labour Party. Douglas' challenge was based on his views that 
Lange had undennined New Zealand's economic recovery and broken Cabinet 
collectivity. 56 Douglas's challenge was unsuccessful, with Lange retaining the 
confidence of the Labour caucus by a reasonably significant margm of 38 votes to 
Douglas' 15. 
Douglas' resignation could be seen as an example of where a Minister resigned partially 
because could not agree with Cabinet. It would be more accurate, however, to describe 
52 Interview by Prebble on Eye Witn ess News Television programme 4 November 1988. See also "The 
Sudden Decline , and Abrupt Fall , of Richard Prebble - The TV Interview That Triggered It" New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, ew Zealand, 7 November 1988, page 9, section 1. 
53 (8 November 1988) 493 NZPD 7682. 
54 "Labour's Day of Crisis: Lange Tipped To Hang On As Douglas Gets Dumped" ew Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 15 December 1988, page 1, section 1. 
55 Douglas indicated that he could no longer work under Lange was taken by Lange to be a resignation, and 
he indicated to the Governor-General that Douglas' Ministerial Warrant should be withdrawn. It is 
arguable, however, that Douglas had not actually resigned, and Lange's actions amounted to a dismissal, as 
they were generally reported. 
56 "Douglas Bid Always Against Heavy Odds" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 15 
December 1988, page I, section 3. 
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this situation as being one where Douglas resigned due to his opposition to Lange's 
political management. 
4 Lange 
Following the relatively bitter infighting within the Labour Cabinet and caucus of 1987 -
1988, Lange's own position subsequently became untenable. This process culminated in 
Lange's resignation on 7 August 1989 from the position of Prime Minister and his 
replacement as leader of the Labour Party by his deputy, the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer. 57 
These changes occurred in the context of Douglas returning to Cabinet, following a vote 
within the Labour caucus on 3 August 1989. 
The re-election of Douglas placed Lange in an unenviable position, where he was faced 
with significant future conflict within Cabinet and would have been operating from a 
position of reduced indispensability. Rather than face the inevitable conflict with Cabinet 
decisions that may have been more driven by Douglas than himself, Lange choose to 
resign. His resignation outside Cabinet can be viewed as a form of anticipatory action, 
taken to remove him from the position where he would face a choice over whether to 
breach the unanimity requirement of collective responsibility or resign. 
There is a theme, however, of political pragmatism to Lange's resignation that suggests it 
was not simply about observance of collective responsibility, and the avoidance of future 
conflict. Lange was also acting loyally to his party, and the vision that he saw New 
Zealanders had given Labour a mandate to enact in the 1987 election. Lange thought that 
by resigning he would ensure that the Labour Party would support Palmer over Douglas 
as his replacement, and ultimately he was correct. 58 
D Evidence from National Government 1990 - 1996 
Following the election of the National Government 1990, the then Prime Minister, the Rt. 
Hon. Jim Bolger, faced almost immediate challenges to the convention. These challenges 
involved the then Minister of Maori Affairs, Hon. Winston Peters59, who repeatedly 
criticised the economic and social policy of the Bolger Government on the grounds that it 
was inconsistent with the Government's election manifesto. 
These challenges occurred against a background of significant tension between Bolger 
and Peters, which had been ongoing for a number of years. Peters had been a popular 
opposition Member of Parliament, out-polling Bolger as preferred Prime Minister during 
the latter stages of the 1987 - 1990 Labour Government. 
57 "Palmer Looks Likely: Deputy PM has edge as Lange steps down" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 8 August 1989, page 1, section 1. See also (8 August 1989) 500 ZPD 11697-700. 
58 Pat Booth "Why David Lange Had To Go ", North & South, New Zealand, September 1989, 53. 
59 18th ranked Minister in the Bolger National government. 
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1 Peters 
Bolger eventually dismissed Peters in a minor Cabinet re-shuffle on 2 October 1991, 
stating that his actions had been necessary due to Peters' continued behaviour being 
"inconsistent with continued membership in the Cabinet and inconsistent with the 
convention of collective responsibility among Cabinet Ministers."60 
Peters' response to his dismissal was to challenge the tenets of Cabinet responsibility, 
claiming that "the first principle of Cabinet responsibility should be to abide by the 
manifesto."61 His inte~retation of collective responsibility, described as a "novel 
constitutional argument"6 by one commentator, was that there was a distinction between 
constitutionally correct governments and democratic government. Peters justified his 
breaches of collective responsibility as being necessary to remain consistent with the 
democratically derived mandate that the government had based on its manifesto. Peters 
had also claimed that he was not constrained by any pre-conditions over his appointment 
as a Minister. 63 
Bolger's decision that Peters' unwillingness to abide by the core practical requirement for 
Ministers was sufficient to justify dismissal illustrates pure political pragmatism. This 
can be characterised as a situation where repeat threats to the unanimity of Cabinet 
ultimately required the dismissal of a Minister, similar to Prebble's dismissal by Lange. 
It also re-emphasised that challenges to the Prime Minister's authority and the unity of 
Cabinet may be tolerated, however, only to a certain extent. 
Deeper insight into the political elements behind Peters' behaviour and dismissal 
inadvertently comes from Peters himself. Speaking of a challenge over his loyalty to 
Cabinet, shortly before his dismissal, Peters said:64 
My challenge to them was, 'Which one of you guys thinks you're bringing more votes 
to this party? You ' re not prepared to answer that question. That's the test. Am I costing this 
party votes, or aren ' t I?' And that's of course where they ' re hopelessly silent. 
This illustrates that Peters viewed his position as a Minister as being a purely political 
decision, based on his value to the party as a vote-drawer. His view understated, 
however, the fact that a purely political decision could also be made by Bolger that the 
value of those votes was not sufficient to justify Peters' continued undermining of 
collective responsibility. 
60 (2 October 1991) 519 NZPD 4639-60. 
61 "Peters vows to overturn Richardson's policies" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 October 
1991, I. 
62 Anthony Hubbard "The Winston of our Discontent" The Listener, New Zealand, 11 November 1991, 22, 
23. 
63 "Fearless and outspoken loner pays the price" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 October 1991, 
8. 
64 Seen 62 above, 22-3. 
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E Evidence from National/NZ First Coalition Government 1996 - 1998 
The 1996 election was the first conducted under the MMP voting system, which has 
largely been described as a reaction to the successive policies of Labour and National 
governments between 1984 and 1993. The announcement of a coalition government 
between National and NZ First65 was, therefore, greeted with some surprise, in light of 
Peters' opposition to Bolger's National Governn1ent's policies following his dismissal as 
a Minister in 1991 ( as discussed above). 
The National/NZ First Coalition Agreement attempted to describe how the convention of 
collective responsibility would operate within the new territory of coalition 
govemment. 66 As discussed in Part II, this Coalition Agreement provided a reasonably 
detailed outline of understanding between the coalition parties over the policy direction 
that they would follow, including the specification of a large number of very specific 
policy initiatives that would be undertaken and provision for reviews of policy areas 
within tightly defined parameters. 
This appears to be based on an attempt to circumscribe the areas where potential breaches 
of the convention may have otherwise arisen, although the Coalition Agreement also 
specifically provided a mechanism for dealing with serious disputes between the coalition 
parties. This dispute mechanism had the potential to remove the need for Ministers from 
either party to breach the convention. However, it is clear from the construction of the 
dispute mechanism that it was envisaged that it would be invoked before Cabinet had 
actually made a decision. Rather, it would operate where there was an area of serious 
disagreement between the coalition parties to enable them to end the Coalition 
Agreement, without having to breach the convention. 
I Peters67 
Perhaps suprisingly, given their previous relationship, clear breaches of the convention 
did not occur while Bolger and Peters were the leaders of the coalition parties. However, 
following the Rt. Hon. Jenny Shipley's successful leadership challenge against Bolger, 
the relationship between the coalition parties became increasingly strained. Eventually 
the relationship deteriorated to the point that Shipley invoked the dispute mechanism 
within the Coalition Agreement on 12 August 1998 in relation to the proposed sale of the 
Government's shares in the Wellington Airport. 68 Central to this issue was Peters' fierce 
65 Statement by Rt Hon J B Bolger - Leader of the New Zealand National Party, Press Release, New 
Zealand Government (10 December 1996) <http ://www.cxecutivc.govt.nz/93-
96/minister/pm/pmn I O 12.htm> (last accessed 3 October 2001). See also "It ' s ational! " The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 11 December 1996, 1. 
66 Although coalition government had been present within New Zealand previously, there had been a period 
of 61 years between the previous coalition government in 1935 and the National/NZ First Coalition 
~overnment in 1996. 
7 2nd ranked Minister in the Bolger/Peters and Shipley/Peters National/NZ First coalition government. 
68 "Shipley now nmning a minority government" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 13 August 
1998, 1. See also (13 August 1998) 570 NZPD 11367-84. 
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opposition to overseas investment, and the fact that the proposed sale was to a consortium 
involving overseas investors. 
Shipley had provided a hint that Cabinet could proceed with the sale, notwithstanding the 
views of Peters69, when she earlier defended the process of collective cabinet decision 
making: 70 
Government is not on the veto of one or two. Government is on the majority. The 
majority agreed that we would go into a process. Cabinet will consider the conclusion of that 
process ... 
Shipley took Peters' actions to amount to a refusal to be bound by a Cabinet decision 
over the proposed sale, a decision that was reached after his walk-out. The process of 
Cabinet taking a decision in the absence of all NZ First Ministers was stated by Shipley 
to be consistent with the principles of Cabinet Government, with her opinion being based 
on advice from the Solicitor General and the Cabinet Secretary. Shipley stated that the 
advice provided to her was: 71 
. . . that the Coalition Agreement does not override the principles of Cabinet government. It 
sets out a series of understandings between the parties at the time the Coalition and how the 
parties intended to apply them. 
Departure from the terms of the Coalition Agreement indicates no more than a political 
difference and certainly does not put at issue the integrity of the Cabinet decis ion-making 
process. 
While the dispute mechanism was ostensibly intended to act as an alternative to Ministers 
potentially breaching the unanimity element, in this case Shipley responded to Peters' 
repeated statements and actions, following the invoking of the disputes mechanism, by 
dismissing him from his position as a Minister on 14 August 1998.72 Key to Peters' 
dismissal was his walking out of a Cabinet meeting to discuss the sale, along with three 
other NZ First Ministers, and subsequent criticism of Shipley's actions during the 
Cabinet decision making process. 
Shipley clearly cited, in a letter to Peters, that his breach of collective responsibility was 
her reason for the dismissal: 73 
It is my view that you have shown a refusal to accept Cabinet collective responsibility. 
Further, you have publicly criticised Government policy regarding the sale of the Crown's 
69 PM's Conduct in Question, Press Release, New Zealand Government (13 August 1998) 
<http ://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speeclu·alph=28079&SR=O> (last accessed 3 October 2001). 
70 "Coalition scrambles for airport face-saver" The Dominion, Wellington, ew Zealand, 11 August 1998, 
1. 
71 Procedures l egal, Press Release, ew Zealand Govenunent ( 13 August 1998) 
<http://www.executive.govt.nz/specch.cfm?speechralph=25792&SR~O> (last accessed 3 October 2001). 
72 "Shipley goes head-hunting" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 August 1998, 1. See also (18 
August 1998) 571 NZPD 11401-29. 
73 Dismissal of Rt Hon Winston Peters , Press Release, New Zealand Govenunent (14 August 1998) 
<http ://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfrn?speechralph""25790&SR=O> (last accessed 3 October 2001). 
shareholding in Wellington Airport, and your actions and statements regarding the sale 
(which expressly or impliedly deny the right of the purchaser to rely on a sales process of 
integrity) are unacceptable. Further, your unfounded allegations in Parliament that I have 
breached some alleged undertakings make it untenable for you to remain as a Cabinet 
Minister. 
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The actions of Shipley can be understood from two perspectives. Once the dispute 
mechanism had been invoked, and it appeared likely that the Coalition would be 
dissolved, Shipley had to respond to Peters' actions for political reasons. In the absence 
of the Coalition Agreement, a refusal to participate in the Cabinet decision process, or to 
be bound by that process, would have been tantamount to a major breach of the 
unanimity element. Given the seriousness of the threat, Shipley's own position within 
Cabinet and the National Party would have been severely weakened had she not 
dismissed Peters. This point was reflected in Shipley's public statements that she could 
not "be Prime Minister of [New Zealand] and have [her] integrity brought into 
· ,,74 quest10n. 
Perhaps more important, the political position of NZ First (and in particular it's Ministers 
other than Peters) was precarious. Support for the party had slumped following its 
entering into coalition government with the National party, and there had been in-fighting 
between members. It was unclear whether a new government would have been able to be 
formed following the dissolution of the coalition, or whether a new election would have 
been needed. 
This position combined to reduce the indispensability of Peters and contributed to 
Shipley's being able to forn1 a subsequent coalition government with the NZ First 
politicians who formed Mauri Pacific. 
2 Donnelly, Morris and McDonald 
Peters' dismissal and the subsequent demise of the National/NZ First coalition 
government resulted in three pre-emptive resignations by NZ First Ministers. These can 
be viewed as being far more a consequence of the break-up of the coalition than any 
breach of collective responsibility, and as such can be characterised as demonstrating the 
influence that political realities have on resignations. 
They are discussed here, however, as Shipley partially used the guise of enforcing 
collective responsibility to elicit these resignations. In a press release announcing Peters' 
dismissal Shipley had reinforced the continuing need for the government to operate under 
the principle of collective responsibility. Shipley had stated that she had: 75 
... the responsibility to the country to ensure that Cabinet was able to perform its 
functions and duties in accordance with the important principle of collective responsibility. 
That was critical in maintaining public confidence in executive decision-making and the 
reputation of New Zealand ... . I have asked [all other Ministers of New Zealand First] to 
meet me and to give me a personal commitment that they understand the obligations of 
74 See n 72 above. 
75 See n 72 above. 
collective responsibility and to give me an undertaking they are willing to comply with those 
obligations. 
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Shipley's ultimatum resulted in the resignations of three NZ First Ministers, Hon 
Deborah Morris76 on 18 August 199877 , and Hon Brian Donnelly and Hon Robyn 
McDonald78 on 26 August 1998.79 These resignations can be seen as an indication that 
these Ministers were no longer willing to be bound by collective responsibility. The latter 
resignations are overshadowed by the fact they occurred on the day that the National / NZ 
First Coalition Agreement was dissolved, reflecting those Ministers' primary choice to no 
longer be a part of the Governn1ent with National. 
F Evidence from National/Mauri Pacific Minority Coalition Government 1998 -
1999 
Following the formation of the National/Mauri Pacific minority coalition government, 
Shipley was again involved in a confrontation which ostensibly resulted in the dismissal 
of a Minister for breaching collective responsibility. This instance involved the exercise 
of Hon Tuariki Delamere's80 powers as the Minister oflmmigration. 
I Delamere 
Delamere, as Minister of Immigration, had a reasonable degree of personal power in 
relation to the consideration of individual applications for residence under the 
Immigration Act 1987. This personal power needed, however, to be exercised in a 
manner consistent with collective responsibility and any parameters that Cabinet may 
have collectively placed on its use. 
Delamere's breach involved a situation where he gave a direction that a permanent 
resident application be approved for reasons that were contrary to Government policy. 
While this may be seen as a matter that is ostensibly within the bounds of individual 
ministerial responsibility, the conflict with Governn1ent policy meant that the decision 
should have been considered in a collective forum. In announcing Delamere's dismissal, 
Shipley reinforced this, stating that "Mr Delamere's own department advised him that he 
was effectively creating new policy. He can not create new policy without the sanction of 
Cabinet."81 
76 22nd ranked Ministers in the Shipley/Peters National/NZ First coalition government. Morris was, 
however, a Minister outside Cabinet. 
77 Resignation of Deborah Morris, Press Release, New Zealand Government (18 August 1998) 
<h1tp ://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speechralph=25786&SR=O> (last accessed 3 October 2001). 
78 Respectively 21 st and 23rd ranked Ministers in the Shipley/Peters ational/NZ First coalition 
¥.ovenunent. Both Do1melly and McDonald were, however, Ministers outside Cabinet. 
9 Ministerial Arrangements Following Dissolution of Coalition Agreement, Press Release, New Zealand 
Govenm1ent (26 August 1998) <http://www.cxccutivc.govt.nz/speech.cfm·7speechra lph~25783&SR=O> 
(last accessed 3 October 200 I). 
80 19th ranked Minister in the Shipley National/Mami Pacific minority coalition government. 
81 PM Asks Governor-General to Withdraw Delamere's Warrant, Press Release, New Zealand Government 
(24 November 1999) <http: //www.execu ti ve.govt.nz/speech.cfrn?speeclu·alph=30 I 02&SR =O> (last 
accessed 3 October 2001 ). 
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In this context, it is interesting to note that Delamere was dismissed solely from his 
position as Minister of Immigration. He was not dismissed completely from his position 
in Cabinet, and retained his other portfolio responsibilities as Minister of Pacific Island 
Affairs, Associate Minister of Health and Finance, and Minister in charge of the Public 
Trust Office. By comparison, other dismissals or resignations have involved a complete 
removal from office. By allowing Delamere to remain in office, Shipley undermined the 
legitimacy of collective responsibility as the reason for dismissal. 
The timing of Delamere's dismissal on 24 November 1999, three days before a general 
election, goes some way to explaining the Prime Minister's partial enforcement of her 
right to dismiss Delamere. This suggests that the dismissal was not motivated by a 
fundamental desire to enforce collective responsibility, but rather by an isolated desire to 
overturn Delamere's specific actions. Those actions had been subjected to significant 
public scutiny, based on claims that his approval of residence was racially discriminatory 
as it involved a requirement to invest in Maori businesses. This conclusion is reinforced 
by Shipley's request that Hon Wyatt Creech, the Acting Minister of Immigration, was 
asked "to look immediately at whether the approvals Mr Delamere had granted could be 
rescinded. "82 
G Evide11cefrom Labour/Alliance Mi11ority Governme11t 1999-2001 
The approach of the Labour/ Alliance Coalition Government, following the 1999 election, 
to the convention of collective responsibility is markedly different. As discussed in Part 
III, the Labour/ Alliance Coalition Agreement clearly sets out the intent of the 
government to be bound by the convention, however, the approach to 'sanctioned' 
breaches of the convention involves a return to the "agree to disagree" concept. 
This concept has meant an increased focus on the coalition parties attempting to resolve 
their differences, with the consequence that breaches of the convention should be less 
likely. The potential relaxation of the unanimity element of the convention, where there 
is a Cabinet decision to do so, arguably reduces the possibility for clear unauthorised 
breaches to occur. 
The potential for future breaches to occur does remain, although to date within the 22 
months of the coalition government there have not been any clear breaches of the 
convention. The 'clean' record of the coalition government in this respect should, 
however, be viewed against a background of three factors. The first is the actions of the 
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Hon. Jim 
Anderton, in dismissing Ministers, or accepting resignations, in other circumstances. 
These actions suggest that any significant breach of the convention would swiftly result 
in a request for a resignation or a dismissal. 
82 Seen 79. 
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This comment is reinforced by the responses of Clark and Anderton to several border-line 
breaches (or 'grey areas') by Alliance Ministers. Notable examples here are the reported 
comments of the Minister of Womens' Affairs, Hon. Laila Harre, in relation to paid 
parental leave policy, and those of the Minister of Corrections, and Disarmament and 
Arms Control, Hon. Matt Robson, on prison conditions and New Zealand's defence 
relationship with Australia. Harre's comments were swiftly responded to by a formal 
statement that the Minister had been speaking before Cabinet had reached a decision
83
, 
effectively reducing any possibility of claims that Harre could have been accused of 
breaching collective responsibility. Robson's comments were effectively over-ruled by 
statements from the Prime Minister that he had been expressing a personal opinion rather 
than reflecting or disputing a Cabinet decision. 
84 
The second factor is the manner in which the coalition government has handled changes 
to policies, after Cabinet has endorsed them. One example here is the changes that were 
made to the Employment Relations Bill while it was before select committee. At this 
stage in the process the convention requires that all Ministers publicly supported the Bill, 
however, Clark was quick to respond to criticisms of the Bill by stating that the 
Government would consider changes as a result of submissions to select committee.
85 
This stance simultaneously indicates that the government is willing to listen to criticisms 
of its policies, yet Ministers' ability to agree that changes to policies are necessary is 
constrained by the need to seek Cabinet approval to changes to those policies. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the coalition government has already exercised the 
'agree to differ' mechanism in relation to the New Zealand / Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement. This occurred in September 2000, through the formal mechanism of Cabinet 
agreement that: 86 
. . . in accordance with agreed coalition processes, the Alliance will be free to 
differentiate publicly on the question of whether New Zealand should ratify this Agreement, 
until the outcome of the proposed parliamentary and Cabinet procedure for this matter is 
determined. 
The constraints of the operation of this 'agree to differ' mechanism were clear, however, 
in the fact that the right of the Alliance to differentiate themselves was constrained by a 
83 Comments suggesting a breach were attributed to Harn'!'s in a Sunday Star Times article on 13 May 2001 
( exact source unable to be located). TI1ese co11rn1ents were, however, essentially retracted in a joint 
statement between Harre and Hon Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance on the same day. See Timeline 
a1111ouncedfor Paid Parental l eave, Press Release, New Zealand Government (15 May 2001) 
<http ://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speeclu-a1ph=34635&SR=O>(last accessed 3 October 2001). 
84 "Vetoed Robson falls into line" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 10 April 2001, 2; "Review 
deals with disagreement" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 10 April 2001, 2. 
85 Source unable to be located. 
86 Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership: Approval of Text, 
CAB (00) M 30/8 (11 September 2000) recommendation h. 
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requirement that they "accept the outcome of the vote in the House (in terms of collective 
responsibility) for the final decision of Cabinet."
87 
This has obviously demonstrated the effect of this mechanism as a significant pressure 
control valve, which allows the venting of inevitable coalition pressures, and party 
distinction, without requiring the dissolution of coalition. The limited use of the 
mechanism has also reinforced that its value in resolving situations of dispute must not be 
diminished by overuse, to ensure that the coalition partners are always continuing to 
attempt to reach positions agreed by consensus. 
The practical application of the 'agree to differ' mechanism is not, however, without its 
own constraints. The tight boundaries placed on the Alliance's ability to differ, in terms 
of being required to agree for Cabinet purposes to decisions of the House, suggest that the 
mechanism was used with an implicit understanding by the Alliance that they would be 
out-voted by the free-trade parties. 
The retention of the ability to publicly maintain their position could, therefore, have been 
seen as a superficial victory for Alliance. This would be an unfortunate conclusion to 
draw, as it actually indicates the strength of wisely using a collectively mandated power 
to disagree in limited circumstances only. By requiring that Cabinet collectively endorse 
each agreement to differ, so long as Cabinet operates under a consensus decision-making 
rule, then Alliance Ministers will be required to agree to rules under which they differ. 
The rule that they agreed to in the case of the New Zealand / Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement should be seen as an example of the terms that they may agree to in the 
future. In any situation where the Alliance Ministers are unwilling to agree to such a 
rule, then the principle that Cabinet should aim to operate by consensus will mean that 
further consultation or consideration will need to be given to either an agreed policy or an 
agreed 'agree to differ' mechanism. By being restrained in their use of this mechanism, 
the coalition government has effectively strengthened its credibility for those situations 
where it is used, as well as reinforcing the credibility of collective responsibility. 
87 New Zealand I Singapore Closer Economic Partnership: Signature of Agreement, POL (00) 181 
(7 
ovember 2000) reconunendation a(i) and New Zealand Singapore Closer Economic Partnership
: 
Signature, POL (00) M 31/6 (8 November 2000) reconunendation a(i). 
Table One: Summary of breaches of convention of collective responsibility 
Table One below discusses the overall nature of the breach, the factors identified in the framework for analysis (paragraphs xx to xx) 
and the nature of the response to the breach, identifying to what extent the response involved sanctions for breach occurring or 
acceptance of the breach. 
Tab le One summarises the strengths of the various characteristics for each instance of breach ("+" signs indicate support for sanctions, 
whereas "-" signs indicate mitigation of the need for sanctions). The description of each breach concludes with a note of what the 
evidence on the relative strengths of these factors suggests should have been the expected response to each breach. This discussion 
also involves discussion of the extent to which the response to the breach was predominantly influenced by political considerations, 
testing the issue of whether any true prediction can be made of when sanctions should apply. 
Details - Name, Date Dispute description Indispensability - Nature of breach - Outside support Circumstances and Nature of response 
and Rank - Nature of breach relative or external seriousness, group timing - sanction or 
or repeat acceptance 
Downie Stewart (I 932) Downie Stewart Relative Repeat nature of threat Outside support Circumstances Breach accepted, with 
3rd/4th ranked Minister. argued in Cabinet indispensability high indicated seriousness probably high as sole embarrassing to announcement Cabinet 
Portfolio included Minister against reduction in due to rank. External of concerns, having urban Minister. Government as had 'agreed to differ . 
of Finance. rents and interest rates. indispensability also criticised economic Downie Stewart was This reflects similar 
Subsequently voted high as sole urban policies repeatedly. responsible for this solution in the United 
against legislation in Minister. area of policy. Kingdom in 1931. 
Parliament. 
+++ -- + -- + unclear 
Downie Stewart (1933) Downie Stewart As above. Repeated threat again As above. Repeat nature of Resignation occurred 
3rd/4th ranked Minister. disagreed with raising building on continued breaches within in accordance with the 
Portfolio included Minister of exchange rate and criticism of economic portfolio area convention. Probably 
of Finance. granting of policy. Increased increased the forced due to 
indemnities to banks stakes given previous embanassing unwillingness of 
against impacts of agreement to differ. circumstances of this Government to tolerate 
increased exchange breach. repeated breaches in a 
rate. Spoke publicly key area of portfo I io 
against policy and responsibility. 
voted against 
legislation in 
Parliament. 
+++ -- ++ -- ++ choice required 
Details - Name, Date 
and Rank 
Algie (1953) 
5th ranked Minister. 
Portfolio included Minister 
of Education. 
Broadfoot (I 953) 
gth ranked Minister. 
Portfolio included 
Postmaster-Gen era I. 
Goosman (1957) 
5th ranked Minister. 
Portfolio included Minister 
of Works. 
Couch (1981) 
1 gth ranked Minister. 
Portfolio included Minister 
of Police and Maori Affairs. 
Dispute description 
- Nature of breach 
Algie argued in 
Parliament for raising 
of special Joan for 
educational purposes. 
Cabinet had already 
rejected Algie's 
proposal. 
+ 
Broadfoot disagreed 
with transfer of profits 
from Post and 
Telegraph Department 
to Government, when 
introducing legislation 
to transfer profits. 
+ 
Goosman disagreed 
with allocation of 
radio time to Social 
Credit party, due to 
opposition to their 
policies. 
+ 
Couch opposed 
Government policy of 
discouraging sporting 
contacts with South 
Africa, including over 
the 1981 Springbok 
tour. 
Indispensability -
relative or external 
Not clear factor. 
Reasonably highly 
ranked. 
Not clear factor. 
Reasonably highly 
ranked. 
Not clear factor. 
Reasonably highly 
ranked. 
Not clear factor. 
Reasonably lowly 
ranked, although 
position as Minister of 
Maori Affairs may 
have had some impact 
due to racial nature of 
this issue. 
Nature of breach -
seriousness, group 
or repeat 
Breach not seen as 
being overly serious, 
rather more an 
indication of Alge's 
support for his 
department. 
Breach not seen as 
being overly serious 
rather more an 
indication of 
Broadfoot's support 
for his department. 
Breach not overly 
serious, as did not 
relate to a fundamental 
policy matter, rather a 
machinery of 
government issue. 
Repeat breaches by 
Couch during a time of 
significant social 
unrest and division 
over both policy of 
discouraging sporting 
contacts with South 
Africa, and the 
Government allowing 
the I 981 Springbok 
tour to proceed. 
Outside support 
Not clear factor. 
Not clear factor. 
Probably mitigating 
factor due to timing 
prior to election, and 
Goosman 's criticism 
of Social Credit being 
beneficial to the 
Government. 
Probably a mitigating 
factor due to level of 
division within society 
over both policy of 
discouraging sporting 
contacts with South 
Africa, and the 
Government allowing 
the 1981 Springbok 
tour to proceed . 
Circumstances and 
timing 
Circumstances 
possibly embarrassing 
to Government as 
Algie was responsible 
for this area of policy. 
+ 
Circumstances 
possibly embarrassing 
to Government as 
Broadfoot was 
responsible for this 
area of policy. 
+ 
Timing significant due 
to proximity to 
election, increasing 
ability of Goosman to 
survive breach. 
Goosman's 
justification on the 
basis that opposition 
was a personal opinion 
only is weaker. 
Couch's position was 
probably strengthened 
by Prime Mini ter 
Muldoon 's earlier 
support for pringbok 
tours. ouch 's 
responsibility a 
Minister of Police for 
law and order during 
the tour probably 
caused embarra 111 nt, 
due to high co t 
involved . 
Nature of response \ 
- sanction or 
acceptance 
Breach accepted 
without resignation 
being required. 
Breach can be viewed 
as sanctioned, due to 
Algie's interest in 
matters affecting his 
department. 
unclear 
Breach accepted 
without resignation 
being required. 
Breach can be viewed 
as sanctioned due to 
Broadfoot's interest in 
matters affecting his 
department. 
unclear 
Breach accepted 
without resignation 
being required. 
Breach can be viewed 
as sanctioned, due to 
nature of criticism and 
limited policy 
importance of subject 
matter. 
sanctions not 
required 
Breach accepted 
without resignation 
being required. 
Breach can be viewed 
as sanctioned, , ith 
divi ion in abinct 
probably being e n as 
acceptable a a 
reflection of di i ion 
in ociety on a largely 
moral i sue. 
Details - Name, Date Dispute description Indispensability - Nature of breach - Outside support Circumstances and Nature of response 
and Rank - Nature of breach relative or external seriousness, group timing - sanction or 
or repeat acceptance 
+ + - - unclear 
Quigley (1982) Quigley criticised Mid ranked Minister, Repeat breaches by Probably a mitigating Timing of Quigley's Muldoon requested 
I Oth ranked Minister. 'Think Big' policies although role as Quigley involved factor due to the lack breaches after 1981 that Quigley either 
Portfolio included Minister on a number of member of group of increased seriousness. of clarity within election supported apologise for his 
of Works and Development. occasions, finally in a Ministers that had society over what Muldoon's actions, in comments or resign. 
speech to the Young attempted to replace 'Think Big' involved. terms of claims that Quigley choose to 
Nationals. His Muldoon as Prime had a clear mandate resign, reflecting his 
challenge to a Minister in 1980 for 'Think Big'. conviction that there 
fundamental plank of suggests some internal Quigley's involvement was not clear public 
National 's economic relative in attempted removal support for 'Think 
growth strategy, which indispensibility. of Muldoon in 1980 Big'. 
was a key Muldoon may have affected 
policy increased the response. 
seriousness of this 
situation. 
+++ - ++ -- + choice required 
Lange ( 1988) Lange 's breach Lange had very high Breach was extremely Lange had very high The timing of the Sanctions were only 
Prime Minister. involved his unilateral external and relative serious, due to its levels of outside breach is significant as available in this case 
suspension of indispensability. As nature as a unilateral support, due to his it related to a very through Cabinet 
announced Prime Minister he had action in the Christmas position as leader of recently agreed reconsidering the 
Government taxation played a key role in Par! iamentary recess. the Labour Party. Cabinet position, issues or Caucus 
and economic policy. the Labour Its seriousness was Lange had support which could be seen as considering their 
Government's re- compounded due to from the Labour broadly reflecting the ongoing support for 
election in 1987. This conflict it created caucus and the Labour economic policies that Lange as Prime 
is balanced by the fact within Cabinet, extra-par! iamentary had recently been Minister. Cabinet 
that the economic particularly with party, as well as endorsed with ultimately 
reforms of Labour's Douglas and Prebble. electoral mandate from Labour's re-election in retrospective I y 
first term had also the 1987 election. 1987. sanctioned Lange s 
been a key to their re- breach , probably 
election. reflecting a perception 
of Caucus support for 
Lange. 
++++ ---- ++++ ---- ++ choice should have 
been required but 
sanctions 
unavailable 
Details - Name, Date Dispute description Indispensability - Nature of breach - Outside support Circumstances and Nature of response 
and Rank - Nature of breach relative or external seriousness, group timing - sanction or 
or repeat acceptance 
Prebble (l 988) Prebble ' s breach Prebble was a Prebble 's breach may Not clear factor. Prebble ' s response to Prebble ' s dismissal did 
5th ranked Minister. involved a refusal to reasonably highly not have breached the Prebble had high Lange removing him not involve a clear 
Portfolio included Minister be bound by processes ranked Minister, and unanimity element of levels of outside as Minister of State request from Lange 
of State Owned Enterprises. over asset sales that as one of the Finance collective support due to his Owned Enterprises is that Prebble either 
had not yet been Ministers had responsibility, but it association with the probably the key apologise or resign. 
endorsed by Cabinet. reasonably high did seriously indicate Douglas led economic factor explaining his Rather, it was clear 
Prebble 's breach external that future cha I lenges direction of the Labour dismissal. His and decisive response 
related to the indispensability, due were likley. Party. Balanced removal can be viewed to a politically 
confidence element of to his association with Combined with earlier against this was as a pre-emptive strike untenable situation. 
collective the Douglas led disputes over caution over Prebble by Lange attempting 
responsibility, and economic direction of economic policy it within the Labour to maintain collective 
involved a challenge the Labour Party. indicated an intent to extra-parliamentary responsibility. His 
to Lange as Prime breach that element, if party. dismissal was more a 
Minister. Cabinet agreed to the political necessity 
proposed processes for following Prebble s 
asset sales. criticism of Lange. 
+ -- ++ ++ political decision 
Douglas (I 988) Douglas' actions were Douglas was a highly Douglas ' actions were Douglas had a high Key to Douglas ' Douglas ' actions were 
4th ranked Minister. pre-emptive rather ranked Minister, and notable for their degree external actions and leadership pre-emptive rather 
Portfolio included Minister thanabreach. His as the Minister of seriousness, as support, largely within challenge was its than a breach . 
of Finance. actions were a Finance had very high evidenced by his the business proximity to Prebble s 
response to his external challenging of Lange community, based on dismissal. As such , it 
unwillingness to work indispensability, based for the position of his economic policy. occurred in a backdrop 
under Lange' s on the importance of Prime Minister. Balanced against this of considerable 
leadership. It reflected economic policy to was caution over Cabinet conflict over 
an unwillingness to Labour' s re-election in Douglas within the economic policy. 
continue to accept the 1987. Labour extra-
economic policy parliamentary party. 
direction Lange and 
Cabinet were taking. 
+ -- +++ -- + political decision 
Lange (1 989) Lange actions in this Lange retained a high Lange' s actions were Lange retained a high Lange' s actions Lange 's actions were 
Prime Minister. instance were similar degree of external and notable for their degree of outside occurred four days pre-emptive rather 
to Douglas' , being a relative seriousness, as support, but it had after Douglas' return than a breach. 
pre-emptive indispensability as evidenced by his been reduced from its to Cabinet. Also 
resignation in response Prime Minister. This choice to resign rather previous levels. This significant was that 
to what Lange saw as had been weakened, than work with reduction can be seen Lange's actions were 
inevitable conflict with however, by in- Douglas. He in the fact that his over l year before the 
Cabinet following the fighting between characterised this as support in Caucus was next election, a time 
return of Douglas. Lange and Douglas. indicating that Labour reduced, and Douglas' he viewed as long 
could not have it both support had increased. enough to allow a new 
ways - it was either leader to be prepared 
Lange or Douglas. for an election. 
+ - ++ - + political decision 
Details - Name, Date Dispute description Indispensability - Nature of breach - Outside support Circumstances and Nature of response 
and Rank - Nature of breach relative or external seriousness, group timing - sanction or 
or repeat acceptance 
Peters ( 1991) Peters' repeatedly Peters had high Peters' breaches were Peters had high levels Peters dismissal Peters' dismissal 
18th ranked Minister. criticised National 's external both repeated, and of external support, occurred in the context reflects the fact that 
Portfolio included Minister economic and social indispensability, based increasingly serious. having out-polled of a minor Cabinet re- the consequences of 
of Maori Affairs. policy as being on his popularity in the They involved direct Bolger as preferred shuffle. It is notable repeated breaches may 
contrary to its election 1990 election, and the challenges to both Prime Minister on that this occurred be a swift sanction. 
mandate. support he generated Cabinet unity and the numerous occasions. without Peters being This dismissal 
amongst Maori. Prime Minister given the clear supports the view that 
Bolger's authority. opportunity to the sanction can be 
conform to collective used in an essentially 
responsibility, political manner. In 
although he had this case, allowing 
indicated earlier his ongoing breaches by 
unwillingness to do so . Peters was no longer 
politically acceptable, 
rather than response to 
one clear breach. 
++ -- ++ -- + political decision 
Peters (1998) Peters' and other NZ Peters had previously This breach was both Support for Peters and Key to Peters' Peters' dismissal over 
2nd ranked Minister. First Ministers had relatively high serious in nature due NZ First had been dismissal was the low this breach can be seen 
Portfolio included Deputy vigorously opposed external to the significance of significantly eroded, polling of NZ First and as strong reinforcing 
Prime Minister and the proposed sale of indispensability, due the issue and the largely as a result of the internal disputes evidence for the 
Treasurer. Wellington Airport. to National 's public interest over the his entering into within Z First. The importance of political 
This breach essentially dependence on him to proposed sale. The coalition with invoking of the considerations in 
involved a refusal to maintain a coalition group nature of the National. While his Coalition Disputes decisions over whether 
allow Cabinet to agree government. initial actions by NZ position had Procedure reinforced sanctions are imposed. 
what to do over the Reductions in support First Ministers also significant suppo1t, the seriousness of this It also involved a clear 
sale of the Airport. for Z First and increased the strength this was not likely to situation, adding to an situation of a challenge 
internal dispute had of Peters' breach . have been reflected in already deteriorating to collective 
reduced this value political support. situation. responsibility, which 
significantly. justified dismissal. 
+++ - ++ - ++ political decision / 
choice required 
Donnelly, Morris and These three Ministers Not a clear factor. The group actions of Not a clear factor. All three of these All three resignations 
McDonald (1998) acted in a pre-emptive these three Ministers resignations occurred can be seen as a 
21 51, 22nd and 23 rd ranked manner, responding to indicated the shortly·after Peters consequence of the 
Ministers. the Coalition break-up seriousness of their was dismissed and Coalition break-up, 
by resigning as position, as did their Shipley asked for a and the understandable 
Ministers. withdrawal from pledge of support for con equences of 
Government as a part collective Ministers having to 
of the Coalition break- responsibility. As resign in such a 
up. such these resignations situation where they 
reflect an arc a part of the 
unwillingness to agree departing portion of 
to such a pledge. the coalition. 
Details - Name, Date Dispute description Indispensability - Nature of breach - Outside support Circumstances and Nature of response 
and Rank - Nature of breach relative or external seriousness, group timing - sanction or 
or repeat acceptance 
+ + + choice required 
Delamere ( 1999) Delamere 's breach Delamere had been Not a clear factor. Not a clear factor. Delamere's dismissal Delamere's dismissal 
19th ranked Minister. involved him relatively highly Delamere had very occurTed only three was a further support 
Portfolio included Minister exercising his indispensable, due to low levels of outside days prior to the 1999 for the political nature 
of Immigration . individual powers as his support for the support, based upon election. This is a key consideration over 
Minister of minority coalition his earlier choice to factor, given that it whether dismissal 
Immigration in a government. This leave Z First to be an illustrates the symbolic should occur. Here, 
manner that was factor had decreased independent Minister nature of Delamere's Shipley's decisive 
contrary to Cabinet due to the impending supporting the dismissal. action was based on 
policy. election. minority coalition the political sensitivity 
Government. associated with 
Delamere's breach. 
+ - + political decision 
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VI DISCUSSION I ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This part attempts to draw trends from the above empirical evidence. This method of 
analysis has been undertaken due to difficulties in identifying cause and effect in the 
small sample size, where the setting for observations changes markedly over time. It is 
difficult, however, due to the small sample size to predict the impact that collective 
responsibility has as a threat to restrain breaches from occurring due to its deterrent force. 
A Trends from 1932 to 1984 
The seven instances of breach between 1932 and 1984 identified the following three 
trends. None of these trends can be said to be particularly strong, due to the long period 
of time over which these examples are drawn from. 
A choice between dismissal and resignation was only required in limited circumstances, 
which were restricted to more serious breaches of collective responsibility. In Downie 
Stewart's case the requirement for a choice came about after he had been in conflict with 
the government's economic policy for some time, with repeated breaches of collective 
responsibility. In Quigley's case, what was essentially a direct challenge to the Prime 
Minister's authority increased the seriousness of the situation. 
There appeared to be a significant degree of latitude for Ministers to note their own 
disagreement with Cabinet decisions in relation to their own departments, so long as they 
did not go so far as to vote against those Cabinet decisions. This may have reflected the 
greater degree of control that Ministers had over their areas of departmental 
responsibilities during this time period (as in the cases of Algie and Broadfoot). 
Where there may be significant public debate or division over an issue then it may be 
more possible for breaches to occur. The key examples here are the breaches by Couch 
and Quigley, although the outcomes were markedly different. The key factor that 
allowed Couch to survive his breach was the Prime Minister's implicit sanctioning of his 
comments, whereas in Quigley's case the combination of a challenge to the Prime 
Minister's authority was enough to over-ride the fact that there was public division over 
'Think Big'. 
B Tremlsfrom 1984 to 1996 
Due to the small number of observations it is useful also to consider the period of 1984 to 
1996 in combination. This period has been selected due to the impact that policies over 
this period had on the calls for MMP to be adopted, and then the proximity of MMP's 
introduction. This split remains relevant notwithstanding that involved different 
governments with different management styles. The similarity that emerges may be 
pa1iicularly telling for the future of collective responsibility. 
The key trend from this period is the emergence of more fundamental breaches of 
collective responsibi lity, where the choice of whether action was taken became far more 
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influenced by political realities than had previously been the case. In particular, the 
dismissals of Prebble and Peters can be seen as essentially being informed by 
pragmatism, where the breach had been of such a significant nature that dismissal had to 
occur quickly for political reasons. These situations were also characterised as being 
genuine dismissals, where there was no clear request that either Prebble or Peters rectify 
the breach. 
The situations of both Prebble and Peters also reinforced a trend commented on in 
relation to the pre 1984 period. In both of those cases, the notion that prolonged and 
repeated nature of the breaches of the convention would increase the pressure for 
sanctions was reinforced by their dismissals. 
Another interesting point to be reinforced during this time period was the fact that there is 
a lack of sanctions directly available for breaches by the Prime Minister. In the case of 
Lange's breach, his ability to retain the support of caucus after an unprecedented action 
was sufficient to authorise that breach. 
The use of pre-emptive resignations to avoid future challenges to collective responsibility 
also emerged over this time period. In the case of both Douglas and Lange, their actions 
involved a choice to resign rather than face a situation where it was inevitable that there 
would be pressure on them to breach collective responsibility. 
C Trends from after 1996 
Evidence from after the introduction of MMP in 1996 supports the fact that coalition 
government may result in cyclical pressures on collective responsibility. The dismissal 
of Peters and Delamere reflected the cyclical pressures that may emerge during a 
coalition's lifetime. In Peters' case the pressure of a prolonged period of attempting to 
reach compromise positions ultimately told in the reaction of NZ First to difficult 
negotiations within Cabinet over the proposed Wellington Airport sale. It would be 
arguable, however, that the timing of Peters' dismissal was beneficial to him, in terms of 
enabling a sufficient period of time in opposition to rebuild support before the next 
election occuned. 
The issue of timing was also important in relation to the dismissal of Delamere, whose 
testing of the limits of collective responsibility increased in the period leading up to the 
1999 election. It is probable that future coalition Ministers will find that they, like 
Delamere, become more likely to face sanctions in the period coming up to an election, 
as the value of the coalition remaining in place decreases to all parties in the coalition. 
This may particularly be the case for Ministers from parties who have had reductions in 
support during a parliamentary term, as their negotiating position reduces in power and 
they face more difficult decisions on whether they breach collective responsibility in an 
effort to brand themselves. At the same time, their value to the other members of the 
coalition may be reducing as the period remaining in the electoral cycle reduces, 
encouraging the other parties to consider their dismissal. 
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The experience of the Labour / Alliance coalition government illustrates, however, the 
value to coalition partners of instituting appropriate processes for resolving 
disagreements and working together in the spirit of consensual government. The 
markedly different coalition records of the three coalition governments that have existed 
in New Zealand since 1996 reinforce the success of the principle and process driven 
Labour / Alliance Coalition Agreement, and the flexibility of the 'agree to differ' 
mechanism it contains. 
In part, this reflects the more natural partnership between Labour and Alliance, but it also 
reflects the fact that these parties focussed on broad understandings over strategic 
direction when entering into their coalition agreement, in contrast to the extremely 
specific coalition agreement between National and NZ First. This approach is likely to 
continue, and should remain more successful, so long as the parties are truly committed 
to the principle of consensus decision making and the maintenance of collective 
responsibility. 
In this context, it is likely that future coalition agreements will continue to include 'agree 
to differ' mechanisms, however, the trend of not relying on these mechanisms established 
by the Labour / Alliance government is likely to continue. This is due to the benefits to 
both parties of not overusing this mechanism, and instead focussing on attempting to 
build consensus solutions, even if they involve compromise. 
The final trend to note from the post MMP period is the recurrence of the use of pre-
emptive resignations, in the case of NZ First Ministers following the break-up of the 
National / NZ First coalition government. In situations where a coalition breaks up it will 
be expected that this will be accompanied by pre-emptive resignations. The timing of 
this will be a feature worth watching for, as it is likely that individual Ministers will 
become more likely to want to distance themselves from a Cabinet that they feel is 
unstable. Similarly, it is will be interesting to watch to see if more genuine pre-emptive 
resignations occur, where Ministers have significant enough concerns with the 
compromises that occur within the consensus building process of coalition trade-offs. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis that this paper set out to test was that breaches of collective responsibility 
were more likely to occur under coalition government, and that where breaches occurred 
they were less likely to result in sanctions. The evidence collected over when breaches 
had occurred identified a number of trends, however, it did not support the primary point 
of the hypothesis. 
It could be postulated that this may be reflect the lack of a sufficient time frame since 
coalition government was introduced, given the limited frequency of breaches, for there 
to be evidence of any trend occurring. This conclusion would, however, ignore the 
significant effmi that both the National/NZ First and Labour/ Alliance coalition 
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governments have placed on emphasising the value of maintaining collective 
responsibility. 
Both of these coalition governments have clearly endorsed collective responsibility as 
being a desirable feature of Cabinet government, and both also attempted to implement 
mechanisms to resolve situations of serious challenges to the maintenance of collective 
responsibility. The degree to which the respective governments have been successful 
differs markedly, although it is clearly not significantly. This is regrettably true of any 
attempts to draw firm conclusions from the evidence collected, and influenced the 
approach taken during the evolution of this paper of focussing on predictive trends rather 
than definitive statements. 
The reduction in clear breaches of collective responsibility under the Labour/ Alliance 
government suggesting that both their less detailed coalition agreement and the practical 
use of their coalition management processes may have been more successful than that of 
the National/NZ First coalition government. In particular, it appears likely that the focus 
of the Labour/ Alliance "agree to differ" mechanism on collectively mandating breaches 
by a coalition party has been successful, and this is an approach that is likely to be 
repeated in future coalition arrangements. As a subtle evolution of collective 
responsibility it will be interesting to note over time whether this mechanism remains as 
effective as it has been over the first two years of the Labour/Alliance government. 
Two other significant trends emerged from the analysis of evidence collected in this 
paper. The first of these is that there appears to have been an increase in pre-emptive 
actions over recent years where Ministers have chosen to resign rather than face 
situations where they consider that they will be unable to continue to agree with Cabinet 
decisions. This trend was supported by resignations around the time of the break-up of 
the National/NZ First government, which suggests that resignations for this reason may 
be more likely to occur during periods of significant conflict within Cabinet. There is an 
increased likelihood that such conflict will occur under coalition government, due to the 
inherent differences between coalition paiiners and their corresponding need to publicly 
differentiate their positions. This trend is likely to continue to be seen. 
Finally, the strongest trend shown by the evidence collected was the role that political 
pragmatism plays in determining whether the requirement to resign over a breach will be 
enforced, or whether the Prime Minister will elect to dismiss for similar reasons. A 
consistent thread through all of the evidence collected was that minor breaches are 
unlikely to be significantly seriously politically damaging to warrant resignation or 
dismissal. 
Once a matter becomes sufficiently politically charged, however, the Prime Minister's 
power to request resignation or to elect to dismiss will be quickly utilised. This supports 
three concluding comments. First, the litmus test suggested by Peters when he 
effectively challenged his Cabinet colleagues to oust him in 1991, of "what will cost the 
government the most votes", is perhaps the simplest predictor of what the consequences 
of a breach will be. Second, the rules about how collective responsibility operates are 
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and probably always will be driven by what Cabinet considers is appropriate at any 
particular time. And finally, collective responsibility ultimately is, as described by 
Joseph, close to a fiction based on the rules of pragmatic politics. 
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